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Abstract
Equilibrium determines leverage, not just interest rates. Variations in leverage cause ‡uctuations in asset prices. This leverage cycle can be damaging to
the economy, and should be regulated.
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Introduction to the Leverage Cycle

At least since the time of Irving Fisher, economists, as well as the general public, have
regarded the interest rate as the most important variable in the economy. But in times
of crisis, collateral rates (equivalently margins or leverage) are far more important.
Despite the cries of newspapers to lower the interest rates, the Fed would sometimes
do much better to attend to the economy-wide leverage and leave the interest rate
alone.
When a homeowner (or hedge fund or a big investment bank) takes out a loan
using say a house as collateral, he must negotiate not just the interest rate, but how
much he can borrow. If the house costs $100 and he borrows $80 and pays $20 in
cash, we say that the margin or haircut is 20%, the loan to value is $80/$100 =
80%, and the collateral rate is $100/$80 = 125%. The leverage is the reciprocal of
the margin, namely the ratio of the asset value to the cash needed to purchase it, or
$100/$20 = 5. These ratios are all synonomous.
In standard economic theory, the equilibrium of supply and demand determines
the interest rate on loans. It would seem impossible that one equation could determine
two variables, the interest rate and the margin. But in my theory, supply and demand
do determine both the equilibrium leverage (or margin) and the interest rate.
It is apparent from everyday life that the laws of supply and demand can determine
both the interest rate and leverage of a loan: the more impatient borrowers are,
the higher the interest rate; the more nervous the lenders become, or the higher
James Tobin Professor of Economics, Yale University, and External Professor, Santa Fe Institute.
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volatility becomes, the higher the collateral they demand. But standard economic
theory fails to properly capture these e¤ects, struggling to see how a single supplyequals-demand equation for a loan could determine two variables: the interest rate
and the leverage. The theory typically ignores the possibility of default (and thus the
need for collateral), or else …xes the leverage as a constant, allowing the equation to
predict the interest rate.
Yet variation in leverage has a huge impact on the price of assets, contributing to
economic bubbles and busts. This is because for many assets there is a class of buyer
for whom the asset is more valuable than it is for the rest of the public (standard economic theory, in contrast, assumes that asset prices re‡ect some fundamental value).
These buyers are willing to pay more, perhaps because they are more optimistic, or
they are more risk tolerant, or they simply like the assets more. If they can get their
hands on more money through more highly leveraged borrowing (that is, getting a
loan with less collateral), they will spend it on the assets and drive those prices up.
If they lose wealth, or lose the ability to borrow, they will buy less, so the asset will
fall into more pessimistic hands and be valued less.
In the absence of intervention, leverage becomes too high in boom times, and too
low in bad times. As a result, in boom times asset prices are too high, and in crisis
times they are too low. This is the leverage cycle.
Leverage dramatically increased in the United States and globally from 1999 to
2006. A bank that in 2006 wanted to buy a AAA-rated mortgage security could
borrow 98.4% of the purchase price, using the security as collateral, and pay only
1.6% in cash. The leverage was thus 100 to 1.6, or about 60 to 1. The average leverage
in 2006 across all of the US$2.5 trillion of so-called ‘toxic’ mortgage securities was
about 16 to 1, meaning that the buyers paid down only $150 billion and borrowed
the other $2.35 trillion. Home buyers could get a mortgage leveraged 35 to 1, with
less than a 3% down payment. Security and house prices soared.
Today leverage has been drastically curtailed by nervous lenders wanting more
collateral for every dollar loaned. Those toxic mortgage securities are now (in Q2
2009) leveraged on average only about 1.2 to 1. A homeowner who bought his house
in 2006 by taking out a subprime mortgage with only 3% down cannot take out
a similar loan today without putting down 30% (unless he quali…es for one of the
government rescue programs). The odds are great that he wouldn’t have the cash
to do it, and reducing the interest rate by 1 or 2% won’t change his ability to act.
De-leveraging is the main reason the prices of both securities and homes are still
falling.
The leverage cycle is a recurring phenomenon. The …nancial derivatives crisis
in 1994 that bankrupted Orange County in California was the tail end of a leverage cycle. So was the emerging markets mortgage crisis of 1998, which brought the
Connecticut-based hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management to its knees, prompting an emergency rescue by other …nancial institutions. The crash of 1987 also seems
to be at the tail end of a leverage cycle. In the following diagram the average margin
2
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o¤ered by dealers for all securities purchased at the hedge fund Ellington Capital
is plotted against time. (The leverage Ellington actually used was generally far less
than what was o¤ered). One sees that the margin was around 20% and then spiked
dramatically in 1998 to 40% for a few months, then fell back to 20% again. In late
2005 through 2007 the margins fell to around 10%, but then in the crisis of late 2007
they jumped to over 40% again, and kept rising for over a year. In Q2 2009 they
reached 70% or more.
The policy implication of my theory of equilibrium leverage is that the fed should
manage system wide leverage, curtailing leverage in normal or ebullient times, and
propping up leverage in anxious times. The theory challenges the "fundamental
value" theory of asset pricing and the e¢ cient markets hypothesis.
If agents extrapolate blindly, assuming from past rising prices that they can safely
set very small margin requirements, or that falling prices means that it is necessary
to demand absurd collateral levels, then the cycle will get much worse. But a crucial
part of my leverage cycle story is that every agent is acting perfectly rationally from
his own individual point of view. People are not deceived into following illusory
trends. They do not ignore danger signs. They do not panic. They look forward,
not backward. But under certain circumstances the cycle spirals into a crash anyway.
The lesson is that even if people remember this leverage cycle, there will be more
leverage cycles in the future, unless the Fed acts to stop them.
The crash always involves the same three elements. First is scary bad news that
3

increases uncertainty, and so volatility of asset returns. This leads to tighter margins
as lenders get more nervous. This in turn leads to falling prices and huge losses by
the most optimistic, leveraged buyers. All three elements feed back on each other; the
redistribution of wealth from optimists to pessimists further erodes prices, causing
more losses for optimists, and steeper price declines, which rational lenders anticipate,
leading then to demand more collateral, and so on.
The best way to stop a crash is to act long before it occurs, by restricting leverage
in ebullient times.
To reverse the crash once it has happened requires reversing the three causes.
In today’s environment, reducing uncertainty means …rst of all stopping foreclosures
and the free fall of housing prices. The only reliable way to do that is to write down
principal. Second, leverage must be restored to sane, intermediate levels. The Fed
must step around the banks and lend directly to investors, at more generous collateral
levels than the private markets are willling to provide. And third, the Treasury
must inject optimistic capital to make up for the lost buying power of the bankrupt
leveraged optimists. This might also entail bailing out various crucial players.
My theory is of course not completely original. Over 400 years ago in the Merchant
of Venice, Shakespeare explained that to take out a loan one had to negotiate both the
interest rate and the collateral level. It is clear which of the two Shakespeare thought
was the more important. Who can remember the interest rate Shylock charged Antonio? (It was zero percent.) But everybody remembers the pound of ‡esh that
Shylock and Antonio agreed on as collateral. The upshot of the play, moreover, is
that the regulatory authority (the court) decides that the collateral Shylock and Antonio freely agreed upon was socially suboptimal, and the court decrees a di¤erent
collateral: a pound of ‡esh but not a drop of blood. The Fed too should sometimes
decree di¤erent collateral rates.
In more recent times there has been pioneering work on collateral by Shleifer and
Vishny SV (1992), Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist BGG (1996, 1999), and Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). This work emphasized the asymmetric information between borrower and lender, leading to a principal agent problem. For example, in SV (1992),
the debt structure of short vs long loans must be arranged to discourage the …rm management from undertaking negative present value investments with personal perks in
the good state. But in the bad state this forces the …rm to liquidate, just when other
similar …rms are liquidating, causing a price crash. In HT (1997) the managers of
a …rm are not able to borrow all the inputs necessary to build a project, because
lenders would like to see them bear risk, by putting their own money down, to guarantee that they exert maximal e¤ort. The BGG (1999) model, adapted from their
earlier work, is cast in an environment with costly state veri…cation. It is closely
related to the second example I give below, with utility from housing and foreclosure costs, taken from Geanakoplos (1997). But an important di¤erence is that I
do not invoke any asymmetric information. I believe that it is important to note
that endogenous leverage need not be based on asymmetric information. Of course
4

the asymmetric information revolution in economics was a tremendous advance, and
asymmetric information plays a critical role in many lender-borrower relationships;
sometimes, however, the profession becomes obsessed with it. In the crisis of 20072009, it does not appear to me that asymmetric information played a critical role in
setting margins. Certainly the buyers of mortgage securities did not control their payo¤s. In my model the only thing backing the loan is the physical collateral. Because
the loans are no-recourse, there is no need to learn anything about the borrower. All
that matters is the collateral. Repo loans, and mortgages in many states, are literally
no-recourse. In the rest of the states lenders rarely come after borrowers for more
money beyond taking the house. And for subprime borrowers, the hit to the credit
rating is becoming less and less tangible. In looking for determinants of (changes in)
leverage, one should start with the distribution of collateral payo¤s, and not the level
of asymmetric information.
Another important paper on collateral is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Like BGG
(1996), this paper emphasized the feedback from the fall in collateral prices to a fall
in borrowing capacity, assuming a constant loan to value ratio. By contrast, my
work de…ning collateral equilibrium focused on what determines the ratios (LTV,
margin, or leverage) and why they change. In practice, I believe the change in
ratios has been far bigger and more important for borrowing than the change in
price levels. The possibility of changing ratios is latent in the BGG models, but not
emphasized by them. In my 1997 paper I showed how one supply-equals-demand
equation can determine leverage as well as interest even when the future is uncertain.
In my 2003 paper on the anatomy of crashes and margins (it was an invited address
at the 2000 World Econometric Society meetings), I argued that in normal times
leverage and asset prices get too high, and in bad times, when the future is worse
and more uncertain, leverage and asset prices get too low. In the certainty model
of Kiyotaki and Moore, to the extent leverage changes at all, it goes in the opposite
direction, getting looser after bad news. In Fostel-Geanakoplos 2008b, on leverage
cycles and the anxious economy, we noted that margins do not move in lock step
across asset classes, and that a leverage cycle in one asset class might spread to other
unrelated asset classes. In Geanakoplos-Zame (1997, 2002, 2009) we describe the
general properties of collateral equilibrium. In Geanakoplos-Kubler (2005), we show
that managing collateral levels can lead to Pareto improvements.1
The recent crisis has stimulated a new generation of important papers on leverage
and the economy. Notable among these are Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), anticipated partly by Gromb and Vayanos (2002), and Adrian and Shin (2009). Adrian
and Shin have developed a remarkable series of empirical studies of leverage.
It is very important to note that leverage in my paper is de…ned by a ratio of collateral values to the downpayment that must be made to buy them. Those "securities
leverage" numbers are hard to get historically. I provided an aggregate of them from
1

For Pareto improving interventions in credit markets, see also Gromb-Vayanos (2002) and Lorenzoni (2008).
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the data base of one hedge fund, but as far as I know securities leverage numbers have
not been systematically kept. One absolutely essential innovation would be for the
Fed to gather these numbers and periodically report leverage numbers across di¤erent asset classes. It is much easier to get "investor leverage" (debt + equity)/equity
values for …rms. But these investor leverage numbers can be very misleading. When
the economy goes badly, and the true securities leverage is sharply declining, many
…rms will …nd their equity wiped out, and it will appear as though their leverage
has gone up, instead of down. This reversal may explain why some macroeconomists
have underestimated the role leverage plays in the economy.
Perhaps the most important lesson from this work (and the current crisis) is that
the macroeconomy is strongly in‡uenced by …nancial variables beyond prices. This
of course was the theme of much of the work of Minsky (1986), who called attention
to the dangers of leverage, and of James Tobin (who in Tobin-Golub (1998) explicitly
de…ned leverage and stated that it should be determined in equilibrium, alongside
interest rates), and also of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist.

1.1

Why was this leverage cycle worse than previous cycles?

There are a number of elements that played into the leverage cycle crisis of 2007-9
that had not appeared before, which explain why it has been so bad. I will gradually
incorporate them into the model. The …rst I have already mentioned, namely that
leverage got higher than ever before, and then margins got tighter than ever before.
The second is the invention of the credit default swap. The buyer of "CDS insurance" gets a dollar for every dollar of defaulted principal on some bond. But he is
not limited to buying as much insurance as he owns bonds. In fact, he very likely is
buying the CDS nowadays because he thinks the bonds are bad and does not want
to own them at all. CDS are, despite their names, not insurance, but a vehicle for
optimists and pessimists to leverage their views. Conventional leverage allows optimists to push the price of assets up; CDS allows pessimists to push asset prices
down. The standardization of CDS for mortgages in late 2005 led to their trades in
large quantities in 2006 at the very peak of the cycle. This I believe was one of the
precipitators of the downturn.
Third, this leverage cycle was really a combination of two leverage cyles, in
mortage securities and in housing. The two reinforce each other. The tightening
margins in securities led to lower security prices, which made it harder to issue new
mortgages, which made it harder for homeowners to re…nance, which made them more
likely to default, which raised required downpayments on housing, which made housing prices fall, which made securities riskier, which made their margins get tighter
and so on.
Fourth, when promises exceed collateral values, as when housing is "under water"
or "upside down," there are typically large losses in turning over the collateral, partly
because of vandalism and so on. In the current crisis more houses are underwater
6

than at any time since the Depression. Today subprime bondholders expect only
25% of the loan amount back when they foreclose on a home. A huge number of
homes are expected to be foreclosed (some say 8 million). In the model we will see
that even if borrowers and lenders foresee that the loan amount is so large then there
will be circumstances in which the collateral is under water, and therefore will cause
deadweight losses, they will not be able to prevent themselves from agreeing on such
levels.
Fifth, the leverage cycle potentially has a major impact on productive activities
for two reasons. First, investors, like homeowners and banks, that …nd themselves
under water, even if they have not defauted, no longer have the same incentives to
invest (or make loans). This is called the debt overhang problem (Myers 1977). High
asset prices means strong incentives for production, and a boon to real construction.
The fall in asset prices has a blighting e¤ect on new real activity. This is the essence
of Tobin’s Q. And it is the real reason why the crisis stage of the leverage cycle is so
alarming.

1.2

Outline

In Sections II and III, I present the basic model of the leverage cycle drawing on my
2003 paper, in which a continuum of investors di¤er in their optimism. In the two
period model of Section II, I show that the price of an asset rises when it can be
leveraged more. The reason is that then fewer optimists are needed to hold all of the
asset shares. Hence the marginal buyer, whose opinion determines the asset price, is
more optimistic. One consequence is that “e¢ cient markets” pricing fails; even the
law of one price fails. If two assets are identical, except that the blue one can be
leveraged and the red one not, then the blue asset will often sell for a higher price.
Next I show that when news in any period is binary, namely good or bad, then
the equilibrium of supply and demand will pin down leverage so that the promise
made on collateral is the maximum that does not involve any chance of default. This
is reminiscent of the Repo market, where there is almost never any default. It follows
that if lenders and investors imagine a worse downside for the collateral value when
the loan comes due, there will be a smaller equilibrium loan, and hence less leverage.
In Section III, I again draw on my 2003 paper to study a three-period, binary
tree version of the model presented in Section II. The asset pays out only in the last
period, and in the middle period information arrives about the likelihood of the …nal
payo¤s. An important consequence of the no default leverage principle derived in
Section II is that loan maturities in the multi-period model will be very short. So
much can go wrong with the collateral price over several periods that only very little
leverage can avoid default for sure on a long loan with a …xed promise. Investors who
want to leverage a lot will have to borrow short term. This provides one explanation
for the famous maturity mismatch, in which long lived assets are …nanced with short
term loans. In the model equilibrium, all investors endogenously take out one-period
7

loans, and leverage is reset each period.
When news arrives in the middle period, the agents rationally update their beliefs
about …nal payo¤s. I distinguish between bad news, which lowers expectations, and
“scary” bad news, which lowers expectations and increases volatility (uncertainty).
This latter kind depresses asset prices at least twice, by reducing expected payo¤s on
account of the bad news and by collapsing leverage on account of the increased volatility. After normal bad news, the asset price drop is often cushioned by improvements
in leverage.
When “scary” bad news hits in the middle period, the asset price falls more
than any agent in the whole economy thinks it should. The reason is that three
things deteriorate. In addition to the e¤ect of bad news on expected payo¤s, leverage
collapses. On top of that, the most optimistic buyers (who leveraged their purchases
in the …rst period) go bankrupt. Hence the marginal buyer in the middle period is a
di¤erent and much less optimistic agent than in the …rst period.
I conclude Section III by describing …ve aspects of the leverage cycle that might
motivate a regulator to smooth it out. Not all of these are formally in the model,
but they could be added with little trouble. First, when leverage is high, the price is
determined by very few “outlier”buyers who might, given the di¤erences in beliefs, be
wrong! Second, when leverage is high, so are asset prices, and when leverage collapses
prices crumble. The upshot is that when there is high leverage economic activity is
stimulated, when there is low leverage the economy is stagnant. If the prices are driven
by outlier opinions, absurd projects might be undertaken in the boom times that are
costly to unwind in the down times. Third, even if the projects are sensible, many
people who cannot insure themselves will be subjected to tremendous risk that can be
reduced by smoothing the cycle. Fourth, over the cycle inequality can dramatically
increase if the leveraged buyers keep getting lucky, and dramatically compress if the
leveraged buyers lose out. Finally, it may be that the leveraged buyers do not fully
internalize the costs of their own bankruptcy, as when a manager does not take into
account that his workers will not be able to …nd comparable jobs, or when a defaulter
causes further defaults in a chain reaction.
In Section IV, I move to a second model, drawn from my 1997 paper, in which
probabilities are objectively given, and heterogeneity among investors arises not from
di¤erences in beliefs, but from di¤erences in the utility of owning the collateral, as
with housing. Once again, leverage is endogenously determined, but now default
appears in equilibrium. It is very important to observe that the source of the heterogeneity has implications for the amount of equilibrium leverage, default, and loan
maturity. In the mortgage market, where di¤erences in utility for the collateral drive
the market, there has always been default (and long maturity loans), even in the best
of times.
As in Sections II and III, bad news causes the asset price to crash much further
than it would without leverage. It also crashes much further than it would with
complete markets. (With objective probabilities, the lovers of housing would insure
8

themselves completely against the bad news and so housing prices would not drop at
all.) In the real world, when a house falls in value below the loan and the homeowner
decides to default, he often does not cooperate in the sale, since there is nothing in
it for him. As a result, there can be huge losses in seizing the collateral. (In the
U.S. it takes 18 months on average to evict the owners, the house is often vandalized,
and so on.) I show that even if borrowers and lenders recognize that that there are
foreclosure costs, and even if they recognize that the further under water the house
is the more di¢ cult the recovery will be in foreclosure, they will still choose leverage
that causes those losses.
I conclude Section IV by giving three more reasons, beyond the …ve from Section
III, why we might worry about excessive leverage. Sixth, the market endogenously
chooses loans that lead to foreclosure costs. Seventh, in a multi-period model some
agents may be under water, in the sense that the house is worth less than the present
value of the loan, but not yet in bankruptcy. These agents often will not take e¢ cient
actions. A homeowner may not repair his house, even though the cost is much
less than the increase in value of the house, because there is a good chance he will
have to go into foreclosure. Eighth, agents do not take into account that by overleveraging their own houses or mortgage securities they create pecuniary externalities;
for example, by getting into trouble themselves, they may be lowering housing prices
after bad news, thereby pushing other people further underwater, and thus creating
more deadweight losses in the economy.
Finally, in Section V, I combine the two previous approaches, imagining a model
with two-period mortgage loans using houses as collateral, and one-period repo loans
using the mortgages as collateral. The resulting double leverage cycle is an essential
element of our current crisis. Here, all eight drawbacks to excessive leverage appear
at once.

1.3

Leverage and Volatility: Scary Bad News

Crises always start with bad news; there are no pure coordination failures. But not
all bad news lead to crises, even when the news is very bad.
Bad news in my view must be of a special "scary" kind to cause an adverse move
in the leverage cycle. Scary bad news not only lowers expectations (as by de…nition all
bad news does), but it must create more volatility. Often this increased uncertainty
also involves more disagreement. On average news reduces uncertainty, so I have in
mind a special, but by no means unusual, kind of news. One kind of scary bad news
motivates the examples in Sections II and III. The idea is that at the beginning,
everyone thinks the chances of ultimate failure require too many things to go wrong
to be of any substantial probability. There is little uncertainty, and therefore little
room for disagreement. Once enough things go wrong to raise the spectre of real
trouble, the uncertainty goes way up in everyone’s mind, and so does the possibility
of disagreement.
9

An example occurs when output is 1 unless two things go wrong, in which case
output becomes .2. If an optimist thinks the chance of each thing going wrong is
independent and equal to .1, then it is easy to see that he thinks the chance of ultimate
breakdown is .01=(.1)(.1). Expected output for him is .992. In his view ex ante, the
variance of …nal output is :99(:01)(1 :2)2 = :0063. After the …rst piece of bad new,
his expected output drops to .92. But the variance jumps to :9(:1)(1 :2)2 = :058, a
tenfold increase.
A less optimistic agent who believes the probability of each piece of bad news is
independent and equal to :8 originally thinks the probability of ultimate breakdown
is :04 = (:2)(:2). Expected output for him is :968. In his view ex ante, the variance of
…nal output is :96(:04)(1 :2)2 = :025. After the …rst piece of bad new, his expected
output drops to :84. But the variance jumps to :8(:2)(1 :2)2 = :102. Note that
the expectations di¤ered originally by :992 :968 = :024, but after the bad news the
disagreement more than triples to :92 :84 = :08.
I call the kind of bad news that increases uncertainty and disagreement scary
news.
The news in the last 18 months has indeed been of this kind. When agency
mortgage default losses were less than 1/4%, there was not much uncertainty and
not much disagreement. Even if they tripled, they would still be small enough not
to matter. Similarly, when subprime mortgage losses (that is losses incurred after
homeowners failed to pay, were thrown out of their homes, and the house was sold for
less than the loan amount) were 3%, they were so far under the rated bond cushion
of 8% that there was not much uncertainty or disagreement about whether the bonds
would su¤er losses, especially the higher rated bonds (with cushions of 15% or more).
By 2007, however, forecasts on subprime losses ranged from 30% to 80%.

1.4

Anatomy of a Crash

I use my theory of the equilibrium leverage to outline the anatomy of market crashes
after the kind of scary news I just described.
i) Assets go down in value on scary bad news.
ii) This causes a big drop in the wealth of the natural buyers (optimists) who were
leveraged. Leveraged buyers are forced to sell to meet their margin requirements.
iii) This leads to further loss in asset value, and in wealth for the natural buyers.
iv) Then just as the crisis seems to be coming under control, margin requirements
are tightened because of increased uncertainty and disagreement.
v) This causes huge losses in asset values via forced sales.
vi) Many optimists will lose all their wealth and go out of business
vii) There may be spillovers if optimists in one asset hit by bad news are led to
sell other assets for which they are also optimists.
viii) Investors who survive have a great opportunity.
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1.5

Heterogeneity and Natural Buyers

A crucial part of my story is heterogeneity between investors. The natural buyers want
the asset more than the general public. This could be for many reasons. The natural
buyers could be less risk averse. Or they could have access to hedging techniques the
general public does not that make the assets less dangerous for them. Or they could
get more utility out of holding the assets. Or they could have access to a production
technology that uses the assets more e¢ ciently than the general public. Or they
could have special information based on local knowledge. Or they could simply be
more optimistic. I have tried nearly all these possibilities at various times in my
models. In the real world, the natural buyers are probably made up of a mixture of
these categories. But for modeling purposes, the simplest is the last, namely that
the natural buyers are more optimistic by nature. They have di¤erent priors from
the pessimists. I note simply that this perspective is not really so di¤erent from
di¤erences in risk aversion. Di¤erences in risk aversion in the end just mean di¤erent
risk adjusted probabilities, which appear very similar to di¤erences in belief when
asset payo¤s are correlated with endowments.
A loss for the natural buyers is much more important to prices than a loss for the
public, because it is the natural buyers who will be holding the assets and bidding
their prices up. Similarly, the loss of access to borrowing by the natural buyers (and
the subsequent moving of assets from natural buyers to the public) creates the crash.
Current events have certainly borne out this heterogeneity hypothesis. When
the big banks (who are the classic natural buyers) lost lots of capital through their
blunders in the CDO market, that had a profound e¤ect on new investments. Some of
that capital was restored by international investments from Singapore and so on, but
it was not enough, and it quickly dried up when the initial investments lost money.
Macroeconomists have often ignored the natural buyers hypothesis. For example,
some macroeconomists compute the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth,
and …nd it very low. The loss of $250 billion dollars of wealth could not possibly
matter much they said, because the stock market has fallen many times by much
more and economic activity hardly changed. But that ignores who lost the money.
The natural buyers hypothesis is not original with me. (See for example Harrison
and Kreps (1979), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997).2 ) The innovation is in combining
it with equilibrium leverage.
I do not presume a cut and dried distinction between natural buyers and the
public. In Section II, I imagine a continuum of agents uniformly arrayed between
0 and 1. Agent h on that continuum thinks the probability of good news (Up) is
h
h
h. The higher the h,
U = h, and the probability of bad news (Down) is D = 1
the more optimistic the agent.
The more optimistic an agent, the more natural a buyer he is. By having a
continuum I avoid a rigid categorization of agents. The agents will choose whether to
2

See also Caballero-Krishnamurthy (2001) and Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008a).
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Natural Buyers Theory of Price
h=1
Natural buyers
h=b
Public

h=0

be borrowers and buyers of risky assets, or lenders and sellers of risky assets. There
will be some break point b such that those more optimistic with h > b are on one side
of the market and and those less optimistic, with h < b; are on the other side. But
this break point b will be endogenous. See Diagram 1.

2
2.1

Leverage and Asset Pricing in a Two Period
Economy with Heterogeneous Beliefs
Equilibrium Asset Pricing without Borrowing

Consider a simple example with one consumption good C, one asset Y , two time periods 0; 1, and two states of nature U and D in the last period, taken from Geanakoplos
(2003). Suppose that each unit of Y pays either 1 or .2 of the consumption good, in
the two states U or D, respectively. Imagine the asset as a mortgage that either pays
in full or defaults with recovery .2. (All mortgages will either default together or pay
o¤ together). But it could also be an oil well that might be a gusher or small. Or a
house with good or bad resale value next period. Let every agent own one unit of the
asset at time 0 and also one unit of the consumption good at time 0. For simplicity
we think of the consumption good as something that can be used up immediately as
consumption c, or costlessly warehoused (stored) in a quantity denoted by w. Think
12

Endogenous Collateral with Heterogeneous
Beliefs: A Simple Example
Let each agent h ∈ H ⊂ [0,1]
assign probability h to s = U
and probability 1 − h to s = D.
Agents with h near 1 are
optimists, agents with h near 0
are pessimists.

h

U
Y=1

1 –h

D

0

Figure 2

Y=.2

Suppose that 1 unit of Y gives $1 unit in state U and .2 units in D.

of oil or cigarettes or canned food or simply gold (that can be used as …llings) or
money. The agents h 2 H only care about the total expected consumption they get,
no matter when they get it. They are not impatient. The di¤erence between the
h
h
agents is only in the probabilities Uh ; D
=1
U each attaches to a good outcome
vs bad.
To start with, let us imagine the agents arranged uniformly on a continuum, with
agent h 2 H = [0; 1] assigning probability Uh = h to the good outcome.
See diagram 2.
More formally, denoting the original endowment of goods and securities of agent
h by eh ; the amount of consumption of C in state s by cs , and the holding in state s
of Y by ys , and the warehousing of the consumption good at time 0 by w0 we have
uh (c0 ; y0 ; w0 ; cU ; cD ) = c0 +
h

e =

h
h
U cU + D cD = c0 + hcU +
(ehCo ; ehYo ; ehCU ; ehCD ) = (1; 1; 0; 0)

(1

h)cD

Storing goods and holding assets provide no direct utility, they just increase income
in the future.
Suppose the price of the asset per unit at time 0 is p, somewhere between 0 and
1. The agents h who believe that
h1 + (1

h):2 > p
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will want to buy the asset, since by paying p now they get something with expected
payo¤ next period greater than p and they are not impatient. Those who think
h1 + (1

h):2 < p

will want to sell their share of the asset. I suppose there is no short selling, but I will
allow for borrowing. In the real world it is impossible to short sell many assets other
than stocks. Even when it is possible, only a few agents know how, and those typically
are the optimistic agents who are most likely to want to buy. So the assumption of
no short selling is quite realistic. But we shall reconsider this point shortly.
If borrowing were not allowed, then the asset would have to be held by a large
part of the population. The price of the asset would be :677 or about :68: Agent
h = :60 values the asset at :68 = :60(1) + :40(:2). So all those h below :60 will sell all
they have, or :60(1) = :60 in aggregate. Every agent above :60 will buy as much as
he can a¤ord. Each of these agents has just enough wealth to buy 1=:68 1:5 more
units, hence :40(1:5) = :60 units in aggregate. Since the market for assets clears at
time 0, this is the equilibrium with no borrowing.
More formally, taking the price of the consumption good in each period to be 1
and the price of Y to be p, we can write the budget set without borrowing for each
agent as
B0h (p) = f(c0 ; y0 ; w0 ; cU ; cD ) 2 R5+ : c0 + w0 + p(y0
cU = w0 + y0
cD = w0 + (:2)y0 g:

1) = 1

Given the price p, each agent chooses the consumption plan (ch0 ; y0h ; w0h ; ch1 ; ch2 ) in B0h (p)
that maximizes his utility uh de…ned above. In equilibrium all markets must clear
Z 1
(ch0 + w0h )dh = 1
0
Z 1
y0h dh = 1
Z01
Z 1
h
cU dh = 1 +
w0h dh
Z01
Z0 1
chD dh = :2 +
w0h dh
0

0

In this equilibrium agents are indi¤erent to storing or consuming right away, so we
can describe equilibrium as if everyone warehoused and postponed consumption by
taking
p = :68
(ch0 ; y0h ; w0h ; chU ; chD ) = (0; 2:5; 0; 2:5; :5) for h
(ch0 ; y0h ; w0h ; chU ; chD )

:60

= (0; 0; 1:68; 1:68; 1:68) for h < :60:
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2.2

Equilibrium Asset Pricing with Borrowing at Exogenous
Collateral Rates

When loan markets are created, a smaller group of less than 40% of the agents will
be able to buy and hold the entire stock of the asset. If borrowing were unlimited, at
an interest rate of 0, the single agent at the top would borrow so much that he would
buy up all the assets by himself. And then the price of the asset would be 1, since at
any price p lower than 1 the agents h just below 1 would snatch the asset away from
h = 1. But this agent would default, and so the interest rate would not be zero, and
the equilibrium allocation needs to be more delicately calculated.
2.2.1

Incomplete Markets

We shall restrict attention to loans that are non-contingent, that is that involve
promises of the same amount ' in both states. It is evident that the equilibrium
allocation under this restriction will in general not be Pareto e¢ cient. For example,
in the no borrowing equilibrium, everyone would gain from the transfer of " > 0 units
of consumption in state U from each h < :60 to each agent with h > :60, and the
transfer of 3"=2 units of consumption in state D from each h > :60 to each agent with
h < :60. The reason this has not been done in the equilibrium is that there is no asset
that can be traded that moves money from U to D or vice versa. We say that the
asset markets are incomplete. We shall assume this incompleteness for a long time,
until we consider Credit Default Swaps.
2.2.2

Collateral

We have not yet determined how much people can borrow or lend. In conventional
economics they can do as much of either as they like, at the going interest rate. But in
real life lenders worry about default. Suppose we imagine that the only way to enforce
deliveries is through collateral. A borrower can use the asset itself as collateral, so
that if he defaults the collateral can be seized. Of course a lender realizes that if the
promise is ' in both states, then with no-recourse collateral he will only receive
min('; 1) if good news
min('; :2) if bad news
The introduction of collateralized loan markets introduces two more parameters: how
much can be promised ', and at what interest rate r?
Suppose that borrowing were arbitrarily limited to ' :2y0 , that is suppose agents
were allowed to promise at most :2 units of consumption per unit of the collateral
Y they put up. That is a natural limit, since it is the biggest promise that is sure
to be covered by the collateral. It also greatly simpli…es our notation, because then
there would be no need to worry about default. The previous equilibrium without
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borrowing could be reinterpreted as a situation of extraordinarily tight leverage, where
we have the constraint ' 0y0 .
Leveraging, that is, using collateral to borrow, gives the most optimistic agents a
chance to spend more. And this will push up the price of the asset. But since they
can borrow strictly less than the value of the collateral, optimistic spending will still
be limited. Each time an agent buys a house, he has to put some of his own money
down in addition to the loan amount he can obtain from the collateral just purchased.
He will eventually run out of capital.
We can describe the budget set formally with our extra variables.
h
B:2
(p; r) = f(c0 ; y0 ; '0 ; w0 ; cU ; cD ) 2 R6+ :
1
'0
c0 + w0 + p(y0 1) = 1 +
1+r
'0 :2y0
cU = w0 + y0 '0
cD = w0 + (:2)y0 '0 g:

We use the subscript :2 on the budget set to remind ourselves that we have arbitrarily
…xed the maximum promise that can be made on a unit of collateral. At this point
we could imagine that was a parameter set by government regulators.
Note that in the de…nition of the budget set, '0 > 0 means that the agent is
making promises in order to borrow money to spend more at time 0. Similarly,
'0 < 0 means the agent is buying promises which will reduce his expenditures on
consumption and assets in period 0, but enable him to consume more in the future
states U and D. Equilibrium is de…ned by the price and interest rate (p; r) and agent
h
choices (ch0 ; y0h ; 'h0 ; w0h ; chU ; chD ) in B:2
(p; r) that maximizes his utility uh de…ned above.
In equilibrium all markets must clear
Z 1
(ch0 + w0h )dh = 1
0
Z 1
y0h dh = 1
Z 01
'h0 dh = 0
0
Z 1
Z 1
h
cU dh = 1 +
w0h dh
Z01
Z0 1
chD dh = :2 +
w0h dh
0

0

Clearly the no borrowing equilibrium is a special case of the collateral equilibrium,
once the limit :2 on promises is replaced by 0.
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2.2.3

The Marginal Buyer

By simultaneously solving equations (1) and (2) below, one can calculate that the
equilibrium price of the asset is now :75. By equation (1), agent h = :69 is just
indi¤erent to buying. Those h < :69 will sell all they have, and those h > :69 will
buy all they can with their cash and with the money they can borrow. By equation
(2) the top 31% of agents will indeed demand exactly what the bottom 69% are
selling.
Who would be doing the borrowing and lending? The top 31% is borrowing to
the max, in order to get their hands on what they believe are cheap assetss. The
bottom 69% do not need the money for buying the asset, so they are willing to lend
it. And what interest rate would they get? 0% interest, because they are not lending
all they have in cash. (They are lending :2=:69 = :29 < 1 per person). Since they are
not impatient and they have plenty of cash left, they are indi¤erent to lending at 0%.
Competition among these lenders will drive the interest rate to 0%.
More formally, letting the marginal buyer be denoted by h = b; we can de…ne the
equilibrium equations as
b
U1

b
+ (1
U )(:2) = b1 + (1
(1 b)(1) + :2
p=
b

p=

b)(:2)

(1)
(2)

Equation (1) says that the marginal buyer b is indi¤erent to buying the asset.
Equation (2) says that the price of Y is equal to the amount of money the agents
above b spend buying it, divided by the amount of the asset sold. The numerator is
then all the top group’s consumption endowment, (1 b)(1); plus all they can borrow
after they get their hands on all of Y, namely (1)(:2)=(1 + r) = :2: The denominator
is comprised of all the sales of one unit of Y each by the agents below b:
We must also take into account buying on margin. An agent who buys the asset
while simultaneously selling as many promises as he can will only have to pay down
p :2: His return will be nothing in the down state, because then he will have to
turn over all the collateral to pay back his loan. But in the up state he will make a
pro…t of 1 :2: Any agent like b who is indi¤erent to borrowing or lending and also
indi¤erent to buying or selling the asset, will be indi¤erent to buying the asset with
leverage because
p :2 = Ub (1 :2) = b(1 :2)
Clearly this equation is automatically satis…ed as long as p is set to satisfy equation
(1); simply subtract .2 from both sides. Agents h > b will strictly prefer to buy the
asset, and strictly prefer to buy the asset with as much leverage as possible (since
they are risk neutral).
As we said, the large supply of the durable consumption good, no impatience, and
no default implies that the equilibrium interest rate must be 0. Solving equations (1)
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and (2) for p and b and plugging these into the agent optimization gives equilibrium
b = :69
(p; r) = (:75; 0);
(ch0 ; y0h ; 'h0 ; w0h ; chU ; chD ) = (0; 3:2; :64; 0; 2:6; 0) for h
(ch0 ; y0h ; 'h0 ; w0h ; chU ; chD )

:69

= (0; 0; :3; 1:45; 1:75; 1:75) for h < :69:

Compared to the previous equilibrium with no leverage, the price rises modestly,
from :68 to :75, because there is a modest amount of borrowing. Notice also that
even at the higher price, fewer agents hold all the assets (because they can a¤ord to
buy on borrowed money).
The lesson here is that the looser the collateral requirement, the higher will be
the prices of assets. Had we de…ned another equilibrium by arbitrarily specifying the
collateral limit of ' :1y0 ; we would have found an equilibrium price intermediate
between :68 and :75: This has not been properly understood by economists. The
conventional view is that the lower is the interest rate, then the higher will asset
prices be, because their cash ‡ows will be discounted less. But in the example I just
described, where agents are patient, the interest rate will be zero regardless of the
collateral restrictions (up to .2). The fundamentals do not change, but because of a
change in lending standards, asset prices rise. Clearly there is something wrong with
conventional asset pricing formulas. The higher the leverage, the higher and thus
the more optimistic is the marginal buyer; it his probabilities that determine value.
The problem is that to compute fundamental value, one has to use probablities. But
whose probabilities?
The recent run up in asset prices has been attributed to irrational exuberance
because conventional pricing formulas based on fundamental values failed to explain
it. But the explanation I propose is that collateral requirements got looser and looser.
We shall return to this momentarily, after we endogenize the collateral limits.
Before turning to the next section, let us be more precise about our numerical
measure of leverage
:75
= 1:4:
leverage =
(:75 :2)
The loan to value is :2=:75 = 27%, the margin or haircut is :55=:75 = 73%. In the no
borrowing equilibrium, leverage was obviously 1.
But leverage cannot yet be said to be endogenous, since we have exogenously …xed
the maximal promise at .2. Why wouldn’t the most optimistic buyers be willing to
borrow more, defaulting in the bad state of course, but compensating the lenders by
paying a higher interest rate? Or equivalently, why should leverage be so low?

2.3

Equilibrium Leverage

Before 1997 there had been virtually no work on equilibrium margins. Collateral was
discussed almost exclusively in models without uncertainty. Even now the few writers
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who try to make collateral endogenous do so by taking an ad hoc measure of risk,
like volatility or value at risk, and assume that the margin is some arbitrary function
of the riskiness of the repayment.
It is not surprising that economists have had trouble modeling equilibrium haircuts
or leverage. We have been taught that the only equilibrating variables are prices. It
seems impossible that the demand equals supply equation for loans could determine
two variables.
The key is to think of many loans, not one loan. Irving Fisher and then Ken
Arrow taught us to index commodities by their location, or their time period, or by
the state of nature, so that the same quality apple in di¤erent places or di¤erent
periods might have di¤erent prices. So we must index each promise by its collateral.
A promise of :2 backed by a house is di¤erent from a promise of :2 backed by 2=3 of
a house. The former will deliver :2 in both states, but the latter will deliver :2 in the
good state and only :133 in the bad state. The collateral matters.
Conceptually we must replace the notion of contracts as promises with the notion
of contracts as ordered pairs of promises and collateral. Each ordered pair-contract
will trade in a separate market, with its own price.
Contractj = (Pr omisej ; Collateralj ) = (Aj ; Cj )
The ordered pairs are homogeneous of degree one. A promise of .2 backed by 2/3
of a house is simply 2/3 of a promise of .3 backed by a full house. So without loss of
generality, we can always normalize the collateral. In our example we shall focus on
contracts in which the collateral Cj is simply one unit of Y.
So let us denote by j the promise of j in both states in the future, backed by
the collateral of one unit of Y. We take an arbitrarily large set J of such assets, but
include j=.2.
The j = :2 promise will deliver .2 in both states, the j = :3 promise will deliver
.3 after good news, but only .2 after bad news, because it will default there. The
promises would sell for di¤erent prices, and di¤erent prices per unit promised.
Our de…nition of equilibrium must now incorporate these new promises j 2 J and
prices j : When the collateral is so big that there is no default, j = j=(1 + r); where
r is the riskless rate of interest. But when there is default, the price cannot be derived
from the riskless interest rate alone. Given the price j ; and given that the promises
are all non-contingent, we can always compute the implied nominal interest rate as
1 + rj = j= j :
We must distinguish between sales 'j > 0 of these promises (that is borrowing)
from purchases of these promises 'j < 0: The two di¤er more than in their sign. A
sale of a promise obliges the seller to put up the collateral, whereas the buyer of the
promise does not bear that burden. The marginal utility of buying a promise will
often be much less than the marginal disutillity of selling the same promise, at least
if the agent does not otherwise want to hold the collateral.
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We can describe the budget set formally with our extra variables.
B h (p; ) = f(c0 ; y0 ; ('j )j2J ; w0 ; cU ; cD ) 2 R2+
c0 + w0 + p(y0

1) = 1 +

J
X

'j

RJ

R3+ :
(3)

j

j=1

J
X

max('j ; 0)

(4)

y0

j=1

cU = w0 + y0

J
X

'j min(1; j)

(5)

j=1

cD = w0 + (:2)y0

J
X

'j min(:2; j)g:

(6)

j=1

Observe that in equations (5) and (6) we see that we are describing no-recourse collateral. Every agent delivers the same, namely the promise or the collateral, whichever
is worth less. The loan market is thus completely anonymous; there is no role for
asymmetric information about the agents because every agent delivers the same way.
Lenders need only worry about the collateral, not about the identity of the borrowers.
Observe that 'j can be positive (making a promise) or negative (buying a promise),
and that either way the deliveries or receipts are given by the same formula.
Inequality (4) describes the crucial collateral or leverage constraint. Each promise
must be backed by collateral, and so the sum of the collateral requirements across
all the promises must be met by the Y on hand. Equation (3) describes the budget
constraint at time 0.
Equilibrium is de…ned exactly as before, except that now we must have market
clearing for all the contracts j 2 J:
Z 1
(ch0 + w0h )dh = 1
0
Z 1
y0h dh = 1
Z 01
'hj dh = 0; 8j 2 J
Z0 1
Z 1
h
cU dh = 1 +
w0h dh
Z01
Z0 1
chD dh = :2 +
w0h dh
0

0

It turns out that the equilibrium is exactly as before. The only asset that is traded
is ((:2; :2); 1), namely j = :2. All the other contracts are priced, but in equilibrium
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neither bought nor sold. Their prices can be computed by the value the marginal
buyer b = :69 attributes to them. So the price :3 of the :3 promise is :27, much more
than the price of the :2 promise but less per dollar promised. Similarly the price of a
promise of :4 is given below
= :69(:2) + :31(:2) = :2
1 + r:2 = :2=:2 = 1:00
:3 = :69(:3) + :31(:2) = :269
1 + r:3 = :3=:269 = 1:12
:4 = :69(:4) + :31(:2) = :337
1 + r:4 = :4=:337 = 1:19
:2

Thus an agent who wants to borrow .2 using one house as collateral can do so at
0% interest. An agent who wants to borrow .269 with the same collateral can do so by
promising 12% interest. An agent who wants to borrow .337 can do so by promising
19% interest. The puzzle of one equation determining both a collateral rate and an
interest rate is resolved; each collateral rate corresponds to a di¤erent interest rate.
It is quite sensible that less secure loans with higher defaults will require higher rates
of interest.
What then do we make of my claim about "the" equilibrium margin? The surprise
is that in this kind of example, with only one dimension of risk and one dimension of
disagreement, only one margin will be traded! Everybody will voluntarily trade only
the .2 loan, even though they could all borrow or lend di¤erent amounts at any other
rate.
How can this be? Agent h = 1 thinks for every .75 he pays on the asset, he can
get 1 for sure. Wouldn’t he love to be able to borrow more, even at a slightly higher
interest rate? The answer is no! In order to borrow more, he has to substitute say a
.4 loan for a .2 loan. He pays the same amount in the bad state, but pays more in the
good state, in exchange for getting more at the beginning. But that is not rational
for him. He is the one convinced the good state will occur, so he de…nitely does not
want to pay more just where he values money the most.3
The lenders are people with h < :69 who do not want to buy the asset. They are
lending instead of buying the asset because they think there is a substantial chance
of bad news. It should be no surprise that they do not want to make risky loans,
even if they can get a 19% rate instead of a 0% rate, because the risk of default is
too high for them. Indeed the risky loan is perfectly correlated with the asset which
3

More precisely, buying Y while simultaneously using it as collateral to sell any non-contingent
promise of at least .2 is tantamount to buying up Arrow securities at a price of b per unit of net
payo¤ in state U. So h>b is indi¤erent to trading on any of the loan markets promising at least .2.
By promising .4 per unit of Y instead of .2 he simply is buying fewer of the up Arrow securities per
contract (because he must deliver more in the up state), but he can buy more contracts (since he is
receiving more money at date 0). He can accomplish exactly the same thing selling less .2 promises.
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they have already shown they do not want. Why should they give up more money
at time 0 to get more money in a state U they do not think will occur? If anything,
these pessimists would now prefer to take the loan rather than to give it. But they
cannot take the loan, because that would force them to hold the collateral to back
their promises, which they do not want to do.4
Thus the only loans that get traded in equilibrium involve margins just tight
enough to rule out default. That depends of course on the special assumption of
only two outcomes. But often the outcomes lenders have in mind are just two. And
typically they do set haircuts in a way that makes defaults very unlikely. Recall that
in the 1994 and 1998 leverage crises, not a single lender lost money on repo trades. Of
course in more general models, one would imagine more than one margin and more
than one interest rate emerging in equilibrium.
To summarize, in the usual theory a supply equals demand equation determines
the interest rate on loans. In my theory equilibrium often determines the equilibrium
leverage (or margin) as well. It seems surprising that one equation could determine
two variables, and to the best of my knowledge I was the …rst to make the observation
(in 1997 and again in 2003) that leverage could be uniquely determined in equilibrium.
I showed that the right way to think about the problem of endogenous collateral is
to consider a di¤erent market for each loan depending on the amount of collateral
put up, and thus a di¤erent interest rate for each level of collateral. A loan with a
lot of collateral will clear in equilibrium at a low interest rate, and a loan with little
collateral will clear at a high interest rate. A loan market is thus determined by a pair
(promise,collateral), and each pair has its own market clearing price. The question
of a unique collateral level for a loan reduces to the less paradoxical sounding, but
still surprising, assertion that in equilibrium everybody will choose to trade in the
same collateral level for each kind of promise. I proved that this must be the case
when there are only two successor states to each state in the tree of uncertainty, with
risk neutral agents di¤ering in their beliefs, but with a common discount rate. More
generally I conjecture that the number of collateral rates traded endogenously will
not be unique, but it will robustly be much less than the dimension of the state space,
or the dimension of agent types.
2.3.1

Upshot of equilibrium leverage

We have just seen that in the simple two state context, equilibrium leverage transforms the purchase of the collateral into the buying of the up Arrow security: the
buyer of the collateral will simultaneously sell the promise (j; j) where j = :2 is equal
4

More precisely, agents with h<b will want to trade their wealth for as much consumption as
they can get in the down state. But on account of the incompleteness of markets, no combination
of buying, selling, borrowing on margin and so on can get them more in the down state than in the
up state. So they strictly prefer making the .2 loan to lending, or borrowing with collateral, any
loan promising more than .2 per unit of Y.
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to the entire down payo¤ of the collateral, so on net he is just buying 1
of the up Arrow security.
2.3.2

j = :8 units

Endogenous leverage: reinforcer or dampener?

One can imagine many shocks to the economy that a¤ect asset prices. These shocks
will also typically change equilibrium leverage. Will the change in equilibrium leverage
multiply the e¤ect on asset prices, or dampen the e¤ect? For most shocks, endogenous
leverage will act as a dampener.
For example, suppose that agents become more optimistic, so that we now have
h
D
h
U

= (1
=1

h)2 < 1
(1

h

2

h) > h

for all h 2 (0; 1): Substituting these new values for the beliefs into the utility function,
we can recompute equilibrium, and we …nd that the price of Y rises to .89. But the
equilibrium promise remains .2, and the equilibrium interest rate remains 0. Hence
leverage falls to 1:29 = :89=(:89 :2). The marginal buyer b=.63 is lower than before.
In short, the positive news has been dampened by the tightening of leverage.
A similar situation prevails if agents see an increase in their endowment of the
consumption good. The extra wealth induces them to demand more Y, the price of
Y rises, but not as far as it would otherwise, because equilibrium leverage goes down.
The only shock that is reinforced by the endogenous movement in leverage is a
shock to the tail of the distribution of Y payo¤s. If the tail payo¤ .2 is increased to
.3, that will have a positive e¤ect on the expected payo¤ of Y, but the e¤ect on the
price of Y will be reinforced by the expansion of equilibrium leverage. Negative tail
events will also be multiplied, as we shall see later.

2.4

Fundamental Asset Pricing? Failure of Law of One Price

We have already seen enough to realize that assets are not priced by fundamentals in
collateral equilibrium. We can make this more concrete by supposing, as in my 2003
paper, that we have two identical assets, blue Y and red Y, where blue Y can be used
as collateral but red Y cannot. Suppose that every agent begins with units of blue
Y and (1
) units of red Y, in addition to one unit of the consumption good. Will
the law of one price hold in equilibrium?
Will the two assets, which are perfect substitutes, both delivering 1 or .2 in the
two states U and D, sell for the same price? Why would anyone pay more to get
the same thing? The answer is that the collateralizable assets will indeed sell for a
signi…cant premium, even though no agent will pay more for the same thing. The
most optimistic buyers will exclusively buy the blue asset by leveraging, and the
mildly optimistic middle group will exclusively buy the red asset without leverage.
The rest of the population will sell their assets, and lend to the biggest optimists.
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Will the scarcity of collateral tend to boost the blue asset prices above the asset
prices we saw in the last section? What e¤ect does the presence of leverage for the
blue assets have on the red asset prices?
We answer these questions in the next section.

2.5

Legacy Assets vs New Assets

These questions bear on an important policy choice that is being made at the writing
of this paper. As a result of the leverage crunch of 2007-2009, asset prices plummeted.
One critical e¤ect was that it became very di¢ cult to support asset prices for new
ventures that would allow for new activity. Who would buy a new mortgage (or new
credit card loan, or new car loan) at 100 when virtually the same old asset could be
purchased on the secondary market at 65?
Suppose the government wants to prop up the price of new assets, by providing
leverage beyond what the market will provide. Given a …xed upper bound in (expected) defaults, would the government do better to provide lots of leverage on just
the new assets, or by providing moderate leverage on all the assets, new and legacy?
At the time of this writing, the government appears to have adopted the strategy of
leveraging only the new assets. Yet all the asset prices are rising.
I considered these very questions in my 2003 paper, anticipating the current debate, by examining the e¤ect on asset prices of adjusting the fraction of blue assets.
If the new assets represent say = 5% of the total, then taking = = 5% corresponds to a policy of leveraging just the new assets. Taking = 100% corresponds
to leveraging the legacy assets as well.
To keep the notation simple, let us assume that using a blue asset as collateral,
one can sell a promise j of .2, but that the red asset cannot serve as collateral for any
promises.
h
h
; 'h0 ; w0h ; chU ; chD )h2H )
; y0R
The de…nition of equilibrium now consists of (r; pB ; pR ; (ch0 ; y0B
such that the individual choices are optimal in the budget sets

c0 + w0 + pB (y0B

) + pR (y0R

h
B:2;B
(p; r) = f(c0 ; y0B ; y0R ; '0 ; w0 ; cU ; cD ) 2 R3+
1
'0
(1
)) = 1 +
1+r
'0 :2y0B
cU = w0 + y0B + y0R '0
cD = w0 + (:2)(y0B + y0R ) '0 g:
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R

R3+ :

and markets clear
Z

0

1

(ch0 + w0h )dh = 1
Z 1
h
dh =
y0B
0
Z 1
h
dh = 1
y0R
0
Z 1
'h0 dh = 0
Z 1
Z0 1
h
w0h dh
cU dh = 1 +
Z01
Z0 1
chD dh = :2 +
w0h dh
0

0

A moment’s thought will reveal that there will be an agent a indi¤erent between
buying blue assets with leverage at a high price, and red assets without leverage at
a low price. Similarly there will be an agent b < a who will be indi¤erent between
buying red assets and selling all his assets. The optimistic agents with h > a will
exclusively buy blue assets by leveraging as much as possible, the agents with b <
h < a will exclusively hold red assets, and the agents with h < b will hold no assets
and lend.
The equilibrium equations become

a(1
pB

pR = b1 + (1 b)(:2)
(a b) + pB (a b)
pR =
(1
)(1 (a b))
a1 + (1 a)(:2)
:2)
=
:2
pR
(1 a) + pR (1
)(1
pB =
a

(7)
(8)
(9)
a) + :2

(10)

Equation (7) says that agent b is indi¤erent between buying red or not buying at all.
Equation (8) says that the agents between a and b can just a¤ord to buy all of the red
Y that is being sold by the other (1 (a b)) agents, noting that their expenditure
consists of the one unit of the consumption good and the revenue they get from
selling o¤ their blue Y. Equation (9) says that a is indi¤erent between buying blue
with leverage, and red without. On the left is the marginal utility of one blue asset
bought on margin divided by the down payment needed to buy it. Equation (10)
says that the top 1 a agents can just a¤ord to buy all the blue assets, by spending
their endowment of the consumption good plus the revenue from selling their red Y
plus the amount they can borrow using the blue Y as collateral.
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fraction blue
a
b
pred
pblue

1
0.5
0.05
0.6861407 0.841775 0.983891
0.6861407 0.636558 0.600066
0.7489125 0.709246 0.680053
0.7489125 0.74684 0.742279

In the table below we describe equilibrium for various values of
Suppose we begin with the situation more or less prevailing six months ago, with
= 0% and no leverage, just as in our very …rst example where we found the assets
priced at .677. By setting = 5% and thereby leveraging the 5% new assets (that is
turning them into blue assets) the government can raise their price from .677 to .74.
Interestingly this also raises the price of the red assets which remain without leverage,
from .677 to .680. Providing the same leverage for more assets, by extending to .5
or 1 and thereby leveraging some of the legacy assets, raises the value of all the assets!
Thus if one wanted to raise the price of just the 5% new assets, the government should
leverage all the assets, new and legacy. By holding promises down to .2, there would
be no defaults.
This analysis holds some lessons for the current discussion about TALF, the government program designed to inject leverage into the economy in 2009. The introduction of leverage for new assets did raise the price of new assets substantially. It also
raised the price of old assets that were not leveraged (although part of that might be
due to the expectation that the government lending facility will be extended to old
assets as well). One might think that the best way to raise new asset prices is to give
them scarcity value as the only leveraged assets in town. But on the contrary, the
analysis shows that the price of the new assets could be boosted further by extending
leverage to all the legacy assets, without increasing the amount of default.
The reason for this paradoxical conclusion is that optimistic buyers always have
the option of buying the legacy assets at low prices. There must be substantial
leverage in the new assets to coax them into buying if the new asset prices are much
higher. By leveraging the legacy assets as well and thus raising the price of those
assets, the government can undercut the returns from the alternative and increase
demand for the new assets.
This analysis also has implications for spillovers from shocks across markets, a
subject we return to later. The loss of leverage in one asset class can depress prices
in another asset class whose leverage remains the same.

2.6

Complete Markets

Suppose there were complete markets, and that agents could trade both Arrow. securities without the need for collateral (assuming everyone keeps every promise). The
distinctions between red and blue assets would then be irrrelevant. The equilibrium
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would simply be ((pU ; pD ); (xh0 ; w0h ; xhU ; xhD )) such that pU + pD = 1 (so that the constant returns to scale storage earns zero pro…t, assuming the price of c0 is 1) and
Z 1
(xh0 + w0h )dh = 1
0
Z 1
Z 1
h
w0h dh
xU dh = 1 +
Z0 1
Z01
w0h dh
xhD dh = :2 +
0
h
h
(x0 ; w0 ; xhU ; xhD )

0

h

2 B (p) = f(x0 ; w0 ; xU ; xD ) :
x0 + pU xU + pD xD 1 + pU 1 + pD (:2)g
(x0 ; w0 ; xU ; xD ) 2 B h (p) ) uh (x0 ; xU ; xD )

uh (xh0 ; xhU ; xhD )

It is easy to calculate that complete markets equilibrium occurs where (pU ; pD ) =
(:44; :56) and agents h > :44 spend all of their wealth of 1:55 buying 3.5 units of
consumption each in state U and nothing else, giving total demand of (1 :44)3:5 = 2:0
and the bottom .44 agents spend all their wealth buying 2.78 units of xD each, giving
total demand of :44(2:78) = 1:2 in total.
The price of Y with complete markets is therefore pU 1 + pD (:2) = :55, much lower
than the incomplete markets, leveraged price of :75. Thus leverage can boost asset
prices well above their "e¢ cient" levels.

2.7

CDS and the Repo Market

The collateralized loan markets we have studied so far are similar to the Repo markets
that have played an important role on Wall Street for decades. In these markets
borrowers take their collateral to a dealer and use that to borrow money via noncontingent promises due one day later. The CDS is a much more recent contract.
The invention of the CDS or credit default swap moved the markets closer to
complete. In our two state example with plenty of collateral, their introduction
actually does lead to the complete markets solution, despite the need of collateral. In
general, with more perishable goods, and goods in the future that are not tradable
now, the introduction of CDS does not complete the markets.
A CDS is a promise to pay the principal default on a bond. Thus thinking of the
asset as paying 1, or .2 if it defaults, the credit default swap would pay .8 in the down
state, and nothing anywhere else. In other words, the CDS is tantamount to trading
the down Arrow security.
The credit default swap needs to be collateralised. There are only two possible
collaterals for it, the security, or the gold. A collateralisable contract promising an
Arrow security is particularly simple, because it is obvious we need only consider
versions in which the collateral exactly covers the promise. So choosing the normalizations in the most convenient way, there are essentially two CDS contracts to
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consider, a CDS promising .2 in state D and nothing else, collateralized by the security, or a CDS promising 1 in state D, and nothing else, collateralized by a piece of
the durable consumtion good gold. So we must add these two contracts to the Repo
contracts we considered earlier.
It is a simple matter to show that the complete markets equilibrium can be implemented via the two CDS contracts. The agents h > :44 buy all the security Y and
all the gold, and sell the maximal amount of CDS against all that collateral. Since
all the goods are durable, this just works out.
In this simple model, the CDS is the mirror image of the Repo. By purchasing an
asset using the maximal leverage on the Repo market, the optimist is synthetically
buying an up Arrow security (on net it pays a positive amount in the up state, and
on net it pays nothing in the down state). The CDS is a down Arrow security. It is
tantamount therefore, to letting the pessimists leverage. That is why the price of the
asset goes down once the CDS is introduced.
Another interesting consequence is that the CDS kills the repo market. Buyers
of the asset switch from selling repo contracts against the asset to selling CDS. It is
true that since the introduction of CDS in late 2005 into the mortgage market, the
repo contracts have steadily declined.
In the next section we ignore CDS and reexamine the repo contracts in a dynamic
setting. Then we return to CDS.

3

The Leverage Cycle

If in the two-period example of Section II bad news occurs and the value plummets
in the last period to .2, there will be a crash. This is a crash in the fundamentals.
There is nothing the government can do to avoid it. But the economy is far from
the crash in the starting period. It hasn’t happened yet. The marginal buyer thinks
the chances of a fundamentals crash are only 31%. The average buyer thinks the
fundamentals crash will occur with just 15% probability.
The point of the leverage cycle is that excess leverage followed by excessive deleveraging will cause a crash even before there has been a crash in the fundamentals, and
even if there is no subsequent crash in the fundamentals. When the price crashes
everybody will say it has fallen more than their view of the fundamentals warranted.
The asset price is excessively high in the initial or over-leveraged normal economy,
and after deleveraging, the price is even lower than it would have been at those tough
margin levels had there never been the over-leveraging in the …rst place.

3.1

A Three Period Model

So consider the same example but with three periods instead of two, also taken from
Geanakoplos (2003). Suppose, as before, that each agent begins in state s = 0 with
one unit of money and one unit of the asset, and that both are perfectly durable.
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But now suppose the asset Y pays o¤ after two periods instead of one period. After
good news in either period, the asset pays 1 at the end. Only with two pieces of bad
news does the asset pay .2. The state space is now S = f0; U; D; U U; U D; DU; DDg.
We use the notation s to denote the immediate predecessor of s. Denote by sh the
probability h assigns to nature moving from s to s: For simplicity we assume that
every investor regards the U vs D move from period 0 to period 1 as independent and
identically distributed to the U vs D move of nature from period 1 to period 2, and
h
more particulary Uh = DU
= h.
Diagram 3 here
This is the situation described in the introduction, in which two things must go
wrong (i.e. two down moves) before there is a crash in fundamentals. Investors di¤er
in their probability beliefs over the odds that either bad event happens. The move
of nature from 0 to D lowers the expected payo¤ of the asset Y in every agent’s eyes,
and also increases every agent’s view of the variance of the payo¤ of asset Y. The
news creates more uncertainty, and more disagreement.
Suppose agents again have no impatience, but care only about their expected
consumption of dollars. Formally, letting cs be consumption in state s; and letting ehs
be the initial endowment of the consumption good in state s, and letting y0h be the
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initial endowment of the asset Y before time begins, we have for all h 2 [0; 1]
uh (c0 ; cU ; cD ; cU U ; cU D ; cDU ; cDD )
h
= c0 + Uh cU + D
cD + Uh Uh U cU U + Uh
= c0 + hcU + (1 h)cD + h2 cU U + h(1

(eh0 ; y0h

h
U D cU D

h
+ D
h)cU D + (1

h
DU cDU

+

h h
D DD cDD
2

h)hcDU + (1

h) cDD

; ehU ; ehD ; ehU U ; ehU D ; ehDU ; ehDD )

= (1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0)
We de…ne the dividend of the asset by dU U = dU D = dDU = 1; and dDD = :2; and
d0 = dU = dD = 0:
The agents are now more optimistic than before, since agent h assigns only a
probability of (1 h)2 to reaching the only state, DD, where the asset pays o¤ .2.
The marginal buyer from before, b = :69, for example, thinks the chances of DD are
only (.31)2 = :09: Agent h = :87 thinks the chances of DD are only (:13)2 = 1:69%:
But more importantly, if lenders can lend short term, their loan at 0 will come due
before the catastrophe can happen. It is thus much safer than a loan at D.

3.2

Equilibrium

Assume that repo loans are one-period loans, so that loan sj promises j in states sU
and sD, and requires one unit of Y as collateral. The budget set can now be written
iteratively, for each state s.
B h (p; ) = f(cs ; ys ; ('sj )j2J ; ws )s2S 2 (R2+
(cs + ws

ehs )

+ ps (ys

ys ) = ys ds + ws +

J
X
j=1

J
X
j=1

max('sj ; 0)

'sj

sj

J
X

RJ

R+ )1+S : 8s

's j min(ps + ds ; j)

j=1

ys g

In each state s the price of consumption is normalized to 1, and the price of the
asset is ps and the price of loan sj promising j in states sU and sD is sj : Agent
h spends if he consumes and stores more than his endowment or if he increases his
holdings of the asset. His income is his dividends from last period’s holdings (by
convention dividends in state s go the asset owner in s ) plus what he warehoused
from last period plus his sales revenue from selling promises, less the payments he
must make on previous loans he took out. Collateral is as always no recourse, so he
can walk away from a loan payment if he is willing to give up his collateral instead.
The agents who borrow (taking sj > 0) must hold the required collateral.
The crucial question again is how much leverage will the market allow at each
state s? By the logic we described in the previous section, it can be shown that in
every state s, the only promise that will be actively traded is the one that makes the
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maximal promise on which there will be no default. Since there will be no default on
this contract, it trades at the riskless rate of interest rs per dollar promised. Using this
insight we can drastically simplify our notation (as in Fostel-Geanakoplos 2008b) by
rede…ning 's as the amount of the consumption good promised at state s for delivery
in the next period, in states sU and sD. The budget set then becomes
B h (p; r) = f(cs ; ys ; 's ; ws )s2S 2 (R2+
(cs + ws

ehs )

+ ps (ys

ys ) = ys ds + ws +

J
X
j=1

's

's

1
1 + rs

R+ )1+S : 8s

R
's

ys min(psU + dsU ; psD + dsD )g

Equilibrium occurs at prices (p; r) such that when everyone optimizes in his budget
set by choosing (chs ; ysh ; 'hs ; wsh )s2S the markets clear in each state s
Z 1
Z 1
Z 1
h
h
h
(cs + ws )dh =
es dh + ds
ysh dh
0
0
Z 1
Z0 1
ysh dh =
ysh dh
0
Z 01
'hs dh = 0
0

It will turn out in equilibrium that the interest rate is zero in every state. Thus at
time 0, agents can borrow the minimum of the price of Y at U and at D, for every
unit of Y they hold at 0. At U agents can borrow 1 unit of the consumption good, for
every unit of Y they hold at U. At D they can borrow only .2 units of the consumption
good, for every unit of Y they hold at D. In normal times, at 0, there is not very much
bad that can happen in the short run. Lenders are therefore willing to lend much
more on the same collateral, and leverage can be quite high. Solving the example as
in Section III.D gives the following prices. See Figure 5.

3.3

Crash because of Bad News, De-leveraging, and Bankrupt Optimists

The price of Y at time 0 of .95 occurs because the marginal buyer is h = :87. Assuming
the price of Y is .69 at D and 1 at U, the most that can be promised at 0 using Y as
collateral is .69. With an interest rate r0 = 0; that means .69 can be borrowed at 0
using Y as collateral. Hence the top 13% of buyers at time 0 can collectively borrow
.69 (since they will own all the assets), and by adding their own .13 of money they
can spend .82 on buying the .87 units that are sold by the bottom 87%. The price is
:95 :82=:87.
Why is there a crash from 0 to D? Well …rst there is bad news. But the bad news
is not nearly as bad as the fall in prices. The marginal buyer of the asset at time 0,
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h = :87, thinks there is only a (.13)2 = 1:69% chance of ultimate default, and when
he gets to D after the …rst piece of bad news he thinks there is a 13% chance for
ultimate default. The news for him is bad, accounting for a drop in price of about 11
points, but it does not explain a fall in price from .95 to .69 of 26 points. In fact, no
agent h thinks the loss in value is nearly as much as 26 points. The biggest optimist
h = 1 thinks the value is 1 at 0 and still 1 at D. The biggest pessimist h = 0 thinks
the value is .2 at 0 and still .2 at D. The biggest loss attributable to the bad news of
arriving at D is felt by h=.5, who thought the value was .8 at 0 and thinks it is .6 at
D. But that drop of .2 is still less than the drop of 26 points in equilibrium.
The second factor is that the leveraged buyers at time 0 all go bankrupt at D.
They spent all their cash plus all they could borrow at time 0, and at time D their
collateral is con…scated and used to pay o¤ their debts: they owe .69 and their
collateral is worth .69. Without the most optimistic buyers, the price is naturally
lower.
Finally, and most importantly, the margins jump from (:95 :69)=:95 = 27%
at U to (:69 :2)=:69 = 71% at D. In other words, leverage plummets from 3:6 =
:95=(:95 :69) to 1:4 = :69=(:69 :2).
All three of these factors working together explain the fall in price.
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3.4

Finding the Equilibrium: The Marginal Buyers

To see how to …nd this equilibrium, let b be the marginal buyer in state D and let a
be the marginal buyer in state 0: Then we must have

a(1
p0

b
+ DD
(:2) b1 + (1 b)(:2)
(1=a)(a b) + :2
1:2a b
pD =
=
(1=a)b
b
b(1 + pD )
a=
1:2
(1 a) + pD
p0 =
a
a
a
pD )
(1
pD )
U
a
a DU
= U1 + D b
a1 + (1
pD
p0 pD
DU

a(1
p0

pD )
pD

pD =

b
DU 1

a
U (1

p0

pD )
=
pD

a
U1

+

a
D pD

p0

a
DU
b
DU

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
a)

a
b

a1 + (1 a)pD ab
p0

(15)
(16)

Equation (11)says that the price at D is equal to the valuation of the marginal
buyer b at D. Because he is also indi¤erent to borrowing, he will then also be indi¤erent
to buying on the margin, as we saw in the collateral section II.C. Equation (12) says
that the price at D is equal to the ratio of all the money spent on Y at D, divided by
the units sold at D. The top a investors are all out of business at D, so they cannot buy
anything. They have spent all their money, and sold all their assets in order to pay
o¤ their loans at D. Thus the remaining 1 a agents must hold all the consumption
goods and Y between them, in equal amounts (since they all lent the same amount
at 0). Hence at D the remaining investors in the interval [0; a) each own 1=a units
of Y and have inventoried or collected 1=a dollars. At D the new optimistic buyers
in the interval [b; a) spend all they have, which is (1=a)(a b) dollars plus the :2(1)
they can borrow on the entire stock of Y. The amount of Y sold at D is (1=a)b: This
explains equation (12). Equation (13) just rearranges the terms in equation (12).
Equation (14) is similar to (12). It explains the price of Y at 0 by the amount
spent divided by the amount sold. Notice that at 0 it is possible to borrow pD using
each unit of Y as collateral. So the top (1 a) agents have (1 a) + pD to spend on
the a units of Y for sale at 0.
Equation (15)equates the marginal utility at 0 to a of one dollar, on the right,
with the marginal utility of putting one dollar of cash down on a leveraged purchase
of Y, on the left. The marginal utility of leveraging a dollar by buying Y on margin
at time 0 can easily be seen. With p0 pD dollars as downpayment, one gets a payo¤
of (1 pD ) dollars in state U, to which a assigns probability Ua a; and nets nothing
at D, explaining the left hand side of the equation:
To see where the right hand side of equation (15) comes from, observe …rst that
agent a can do better by inventorying the dollar (i.e. warehousing the consumption
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good by taking w0 > 0) at time 0 rather than consuming it. With probablity Ua a;
a
U will be reached and this dollar will be worth one utile. With probability D
1 a,
D will be reached and a will want to leverage the dollar into as big a purchase of Y
as possible. This will result in a gain at D of
a(1
pD

a(1 :2)
:2)
=
:2
b1 + (1 b)(:2)

:2

=

a
b

Hence the marginal utility of a dollar at time 0 is a1 + (1 a) ab ; explaining the right
hand side of equation (15):
Equation (16) says that a is indi¤erent to buying Y on margin at 0 or buying it
for cash. The right hand side shows that by spending p0 dollars to buy Y at 0, agent
a can get a payo¤ of 1 with probability a, and with probability (1 a) a payo¤ of PD
dollars at D, which is worth pD ab to a: Equation (16) is a tautological consequence of
the previous equation. To see this, note that by rewriting equation (15) and using
the identity = implies = +
we get
+
a(1
p0

pD [a1 + (1 a) ab ]
pD )
=
pD
pD
a(1 pD ) + pD [a1 + (1
=
p0 pD + pD
a1 + (1 a)pD ab
=
p0

a) ab ]

which is the last equation (16).
By guessing a value of b, and then iterating through all the equations, one ends
up with all the variables speci…ed, and a new value of b. By searching for a …xed
point in b, one quickly comes to the solution just described, with the crash from :95
to :69.

3.5

Quantifying the contributions of bad news, deleveraging,
and bankruptcy of the optimists

In the crisis of 2007-9 there has been bad news, but according to most …nancial
analysts, the price of assets fell much farther than would have been warranted by the
news. There have been numerous bankruptcies of mortgage companies, and even of
great investment banks. And the drop in leverage has been enormous.
These kind of events had occured before in 1994 and 1998. The cycle is more
severe this time because the leverage was higher, and the bad news was worse.
Of the three symptoms of the leverage cycle collapse, which is playing the biggest
role in our example? This is an easy calculation to make, because we can introduce
each of the three e¤ects on its own into the model and then see how much the price
.95 declines.
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The bad news has the e¤ect of increasing the probability each agent h assigns to
the low payo¤ of .2 at DD from (1 ph)2 to (1 h): So we can recalculate equilibrium
h
in the same tree, but with sD
(1 h) > (1 h) for all s = 0; U; D: The result
is that at node 0 the price is now .79. Thus roughly 60% of the drop in value from
.95 to .69 comes from the bad news itself.
But that still leaves 40% of the drop explainable only by non-fundamentals (or
technicals as they are sometimes called). We can decompose this 40% into the part
that comes from the bankruptcy and disappearance of the most optimistic buyers,
and the rest due to the deleveraging.
In the main example, the most optimistic 13% went bankrupt at D. We can isolate
this e¤ect simply by beginning with an economy without these agents. Replacing the
set of traders [0; 1] with [0; :87], and therefore the value 1 with .87 in the appropriate
equations (12),(13),(14), one can repeat the calculation and …nd that the price at the
original node is .89, a drop of 6 points from the original .95, and roughy 20% of the
original 26 point drop in the example from 0 to D.
In the main example the deleveraging occurred at D when the maximal promise
was reduced to .2. We can simulate the deleveraging e¤ect alone by reducing our
tree to the old one-period model, but replacing the probability of down of 1 h with
(1 h)2 : In that new model the equilibrium promise at node 0 will be just .2, but
investors will still assign the .2 payo¤ probability (1 h)2 : This gives an initial price
for the asset of .89. Thus deleveraging also explains about 20% of the price crash.
The roughy linear decomposition of the three factors is due to the linearity of the
h
h
beliefs sU
= h; sD
= 1 h in h: In my 2003 paper I analyzed exactly this same
model but with more optimistic beliefs because I wanted to avoid this linearity, and
also to illustrate a smaller crash consistent with the minor leverage cycle crash of
h
h
= (1 h)2 ; giving probability (1 h)4 of
= 1 (1 h)2 ; sD
1998. I assumed sU
h
reaching DD from 0: In that speci…cation there are many investors with sU
near to
1, but once h moves far from 1, the decline in optimism happens faster and faster. In
that model the price at 0 is p0Y = :99 and the price falls only 12 points to p0D = :87
at D. Only the top 6% of investors buy at 0, since they can leverage so much, and
thus go bankrupt at D. Without them from the beginning, the price would still be
.99, hence the loss of the top tier itself contributes very little. Bad news alone in
that model reduces to the example I have been considering here, which has a starting
price of p0Y = :95:5 Deleveraging alone in that example results in a starting price of
p0Y = :98: Hence the three factors independently add up to much less than the total
drop. In that example it was the feedback between the three causes that explained
much of the drop. In the example in this paper, the total drop is very close to the
sum of the parts.
5

There was an error in my 2003 paper where I reported that the starting price would be .99 in
the example of this paper (instead of .95).
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3.6

Conservative optimists

It is very important, and very characteristic of the leverage cycle, that after the
crash, returns are much higher than usual. Survivors of the crash always have great
opportunities. One might well wonder why investors in the example do not foresee
that there might be a crash, and keep their powder dry in cash (or in assets but
without leverage) at 0, waiting to make a killing if the economy goes to D. The
answer is that many of them do exactly that.
The marginal buyer at 0 is h = :87. He assigns probability 1:69% = (:13)2 to
reaching DD. So he values the asset at 0 at more than .98, yet he he is not rushing to
buy at the price of .95. The reason is that he is precisely looking toward the future.
These calculations are embodied in equation (15) of Section III.D. The marginal
utility to a of reaching the down state with a dollar of dry powder is not (1 a),
but (1 a)(a=b) precisely because a anticipates that he will have a spectacular gross
expected return of a=b at D.
In fact all the investors between .87 and .74 are refraining from buying what they
regard as an underpriced asset at 0, in order to keep their powder dry for the killing
at D. If there were only more of them, of course, there would be no crash at D. But
as their numbers rise, so does the price at D, and so their temptation to wait ebbs.
It is after all a rare bird who thinks the returns at D are so great, yet thinks D
is su¢ ciently likely to be worth waiting for. This is owing to my assumption that
investors who think the …rst piece of bad news is relatively unlikely (high h) also
think the second piece of bad news is relatively unlikely (high h again) even after
they see the …rst piece of bad news. This assumption corresponds to my experience
that hedge fund managers generally are the ones saying things are not that bad, even
after they start going bad.

3.7

Endogenous Maturity Mismatch

Many authors have lamented the dangers of short term borrowing on long term assets,
as we have in this example. It is important to observe that the short term loans I
described in the three period model arise endogenously. If long, two period noncontingent loans were also available, then by the previous arguments, since there are
only two outcomes even in the …nal period, the only potentially traded long term loan
would promise .2 in every state. But the borrowers would much prefer to borrow .69
on the short term loan. So the long term loans would not be traded.
This preference for short term loans is an important feature of real markets.
Lenders know that much less can go wrong in a day than in a year, and so they are
willing to lend much more for a day on the same collateral than they would for a year.
Eager borrowers choose the larger quantity of short term loans, and presto, we have
an endogenous maturity mismatch. Endogenous collateral can resolve the puzzle of
what causes maturity mismatch.
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3.8

CDS

In my view an important trigger for the collapse of 2007-2009 was the introduction
of CDS contracts into the mortgage market in late 2005, at the height of the market.
CDS on corporate bonds had been traded for years, but until 2005 there had been no
standardized mortgage CDS contract. I do not know the impetus for this standardization; perhaps more people wanted to short the market once it got so high. But
the implication was that afterward the pessimists, as well as the optimists, had an
opportunity to leverage. This was bound to depress mortgage security prices. As I
show in Section V on the double leverage cycle, this in turn forced underwriters of
mortgage securities to require mortgage loans with higher collateral so they would be
more attractive packages, which in turn made it impossible for homeowners to re…nance their mortgages, forcing many to default, which then began to depress home
prices, which then made it even harder to sell new mortgages and so on. I believe the
introduction of CDS trading on a grand scale in mortgages is a critical, overlooked
factor in the crisis. Until now people have assumed it all began when home prices
started to fall in 2006. But why home prices should begin to fall then has remained
a mystery.
To see the e¤ect of introducing a CDS market midstream, suppose in our model
that everyone anticipated correctly that the CDS market would get introduced in the
middle period. Computing equilibrium with repo markets at time 0 and complete
markets from time 1 onwards, we get not just a 26 point drop, but a bigger crash of
poY = :85 to pDY = :51: The drop becomes an astonishing 34 points, or 40%. If the
introduction of the CDS market occured in the middle period, but was unanticipated,
the crash would be even worse. The sudden introduction of CDS in 2005 probably
played a bigger role than people realize.
Of course if CDS were introduced from the beginning, prices would never have
gotten so high. But they were only introduced after the market was at its peak.

3.9

Complete Markets

The introduction of CDS from the beginning moves the markets close to complete.
It is easy to compute the complete markets equilibrium. Nobody would consume
until the …nal period, when all the information had been revealed. So we need only
…nd four prices of consumption at UU,UD,DU, and DD. The supplies of goods are
respectively 2,2,2,1.2, and the most optimistic people will exclusively consume good
UU, the next most optimistic will exclusively consume UD and so on. The prices
turn out to be pU U = :29; pU D = :16; pDU = :16; pDD = :39: This gives a drop of Y
from p0Y = :68 to pDY = :43:
The complete markets prices are systematically lower than the collateral equilibrium, because e¤ectively complete markets amounts to adding the CDS, which means
the pessimists can leverage as well.
With complete markets there is high volatility as well. Indeed the drop in prices
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from 0 to D is as big as before. With complete markets, the optimists bet on U,
selling their wealth at D. The price at D therefore re‡ects the opinions of the people
who have wealth there, and they are more pessimistic people than at U or 0, and
thus we get a big drop in prices at D even with complete markets.
The phenomenon of bigger price drops than anybody thinks is justi…ed is thus
consistent with complete markets as well. But I feel it is more likely with incomplete
markets. For example, suppose that we change the beliefs of the agents so that agent
h thinks the probability of up is never less than .6, that is suppose
h
sU

= max(h; :6) for all h and s = 0; D; U

The collateral equilibrium described in the leverage cycle, in which the price of Y
dropped from p0Y = :95 to pDY = :69, is absolutely unchanged, since the lowest
marginal buyer was b = :61 at D. The opinions of h < :61 never mattered. On the
other hand, the complete markets prices are now p0Y = :87 = (1 (1 :6)2 )1 + (1
:6)2 (:2) and pDY = :68 = :6(1) + :4(:2): With complete markets the price drop is only
2/3 the size of the collateral equilibrium price drop, and it is completely explained
by the bad news as seen by every agent with h :6:

3.10

Five Reasons the Leverage Cycle is Bad

The wild gyrations in asset prices as equilibrium leverage ebbs and ‡ows is alarming
in and of itself. But behind the volatility there are …ve more serious problems.
First, very high leverage means that the asset prices are set by a small group of
investors. If agent beliefs are heterogeneous, why should the prices be determined
entirely by the highest outliers? In the model above just the top 13% determined the
price of the asset at date 0. In my 2003 paper, it was just the top 6% who determined
the price. So few people should not have so much power to determine crucial prices.
Leverage allows the few to wield great in‡uence.
Second, if we add production to the economy, especially of the irreversible kind,
then we would …nd a huge wave of overbuilding. The asset price at 0 is well above the
complete markets price, because of the expectation by the leveraged few, that good
times were coming. In the bad state that overbuilding would need to be dismantled
at great cost.
Third, asset prices can have a profound e¤ect on economic activity. As Tobin
argued with his concept of Q, when the prices of old assets are high, new productive
activity, which often involves issuing …nancial assets that are close substitutes for the
old assets, is stimulated. When asset prices are low, new activity might grind to a
halt. If we added another group of small business people to the model who did not
participate in …nancial markets generally, we would …nd that they could easily sell
loans at time 0, but would have a hard time at D. Government policy may well have
the goal of protecting these people by smoothing out the leverage cycle. It can easily
be checked that if a regulation were passed that limited promises at date 0 to say
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.4 (instead of .69), then prices at time 0 would fall from .95 to .91, and prices at D
would rise from .69 to .70.
Fourth, the large ‡uctuations in asset prices over the leverage cycle lead to massive
redistributions of wealth and changes in inequality. At the beginning everybody has
an equal share of wealth. In the ebullient stage, the optimists become 30% richer
than the pessimists, while in the intermediate down state, the optimists go broke.
Inequality becomes extreme in both states.
This brings us to the …fth potential cost of too much leverage. Instead of regarding
the optimists as crazy, let us think of them as indispensable to the economy. That is
probably what is meant by the modern term "too big to fail". Geanakoplos-Kubler
(2005) shows that if their marginal contribution to society is bigger than what they are
paid, then their bankruptcy results in an externality, since they internalize only their
private loss in calculating how much leverage to take on. If in addition the bankruptcy
of one optimist makes it more likely in the short run that other optimists will go
bankrupt, then the externality can become so big that simply curtailing leverage can
make everybody better o¤.
In the next section I drop CDS and return to leveraged loans, but analyze the
more conventional case of common priors and diminishing marginal utility. I …nd
that if some agents get more utility out of holding the collateral than others, then
the endogenous equilibrium leverage may well involve default. Default can give rise
to further ine¢ ciencies, giving us more reasons to monitor and regulate leverage.

4

Heterogeneity based on Utility for Collateral:
Endogenous Default

So far we have assumed a continuum of risk neutral agents with identical time discounting, who di¤ered in their taste for the collateral on account of their di¤erent
priors about the collateral payo¤s. In this section we introduce an alternative difference, namely that some agents simply enjoy a higher utility from holding the
collateral, such as when they use their houses as collateral. We assume common priors. We …nd once again that there is a unique leverage chosen in equilibrium. But
this time the leverage is not the maximal amount short of default. On the contrary,
we now …nd that the market will select a promise in which there is a great deal of
default in the bad state. Worse still, even if both the borrowers and lenders realize
there is a substantial foreclosure cost (to seizing the collateral in case of default), the
free market will still choose promises which allow for a great deal of default.
In this model, if we introduce CDS to complete the markets, it turns out that
nobody will trade them. Thus the markets are endogenously incomplete: even if
every contract can be written, the market will only choose a few because of the need
for collateral.
Because we have only two types of agents in this model, equilibrium will not
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necessarily entail a marginal agent indi¤erent to buying the asset. We shall …nd that
every buyer of the collateral strictly prefers to buy on margin (i.e. leveraged) to
buying outright. In fact, no agent is willing to buy the collateral with 100% cash
down.

4.1

Example: Borrowing Across Time

We consider an example taken from Geanakoplos (1997) with two kinds of agents
H = fA; Bg, two time periods, and two goods F (food) and H (housing) in each
period. For now we shall suppose that there is only one state of nature in the last
period.
We suppose that food is completely perishable, while housing is perfectly durable.
We suppose that agent B likes living in a house much more than agent A,
uA (x0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) = x0F + x0H + x1F + x1H ;
uB (x0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) = 9x0F

2x20F + 15x0H + x1F + 15x1H :

Furthermore, we suppose that the endowments are such that agent B is very poor
in the early period, but wealthy later, while agent A owns the housing stock
A
A
A
eA = (eA
0F ; e0H ; e1F ; e1H ) = (20; 1; 20; 0) ;
B
B
B
eB = (eB
0F ; e0H ; e1F ; e1H ) = (4; 0; 50; 0) :

We suppose that there are contracts (Aj ; Cj ) with Aj = (j; 0); promising j units
of food in period 1, and no housing, each collateralized by one house Cj = (0; 1)
as before. We introduce a new piece of notation D1j to denote the value of actual
deliveries of asset j at time 1. Given our no recourse collateral, we know D1j =
min(jp1F ; p1H ):
4.1.1

Arrow–Debreu Equilibrium

If in addition we had a complete set of Arrow securities with in…nite default penalties
and no collateral requirements, then it is easy to see that there would be a unique
equilibrium (in prices and utility payo¤s):
p=(p0F ; p0H ; p1F ; p1H ) = (1; 30; 1; 15) ;
A
A
A
x =(xA
0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) = (22; 0; 48; 0) ;
A

B
B
B
xB=(xB
0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) = (2; 1; 22; 1) ;

uA=70 ; uB = 62 :
Assuming that A consumes food in both periods, the price of food would need to
be the same in both periods, since A’s marginal utility for food is the same in both
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periods. We might as well take those prices to be 1. Assuming that B consumes food
in the last period, the price of every good that B consumes must then be equal to
B’s marginal utility for that good. With complete markets, the B agents would be
able to borrow as much as they wanted, and they would then have the resources to
bid the price of housing up to 30 in period 0 and 15 in period 1.
4.1.2

No Collateral–No contracts Equilibrium

Without the sophisticated …nancial arrangements involved with collateral or default
penalties, there would be nothing to induce agents to keep their promises. Recognizing
this, the market would set a price j = 0 for the contracts. Agents would therefore
not be able to borrow any money. Thus agents of type B, despite their great desire
to live in housing, and great wealth in period 1, would not be able to purchase much
housing in the initial period. Again it is easy to calculate the unique equilibrium:
=0
p = (p0F ; p0H ; p1F ; p1H ) = (1; 16; 1; 15) ;
71
71 15
71
A
A
A
; 35
;0
xA = (xA
20 + ; 1
0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) =
32
32 16
32 16
71
71 15
57
B
B
B
xB = (xB
;
; 35 +
;1 ;
0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) =
32 32 16
32 16
uA = 56 ; uB 64 :
j

;

In the …nal period 1, agents of type B are rich and they will bid the house price
up to their marginal utility of 15. Agent A, realizing that he can sell the house for
15 in period 1, is e¤ectively paying only 16 15 = 1 to have a house in period 0,
and is therefore indi¤erent to how much housing he consumes in period 0. Agents of
type B, on the other hand, spend their available wealth at time 0 on housing until
, which is the marginal utility
their marginal utility of consumption of x0F rises to 30
16
of owning an extra dollar’s worth of housing stock at time 0. That occurs when
57
30
B
9 4xB
0F = 16 , that is, when x0F = 32 .
4.1.3

Collateral Equilibrium

We now introduce the possibility of collateral, i.e. we suppose the state apparatus is
such that the house is con…scated if payments are not made. The unique equilibrium
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is then:
Dj = min(j; 15); j = min(j; 15) ;
p = (p0F ; p0H ; p1F ; p1H ) = (1; 18; 1; 15) ;
A
A
A
xA = (xA
0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) = (23; 0; 35; 0) ;

'A
15 =

15 ; 'A
j = 0 for j 6= 15 ;

B
B
B
xB = (xB
0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ) = (1; 1; 35; 1) ;
B
'B
15 = 15 ; 'j = 0 for j 6= 15;

uA = 58 ; uB = 72 :

The only contract traded is the one j = 15 that maximizes the promise that will not
be broken. Its price 15 = 15 is given by its marginal utility to its buyer A. Agent
B sells the contract, thereby borrowing 15 units of x0F ; and uses the 15 units of x0F
plus 3 he owns himself to buy 1 unit of the house x0H , at a price of p0H = 18: He uses
the house as collateral on the loan, paying o¤ in full the 15 units of x1F in period 1.
Since, as borrower, agent B gets to consume the housing services while the house is
being used as collateral, he gets …nal utility of 72. Agent A sells all his housing stock,
since the best he can do after buying it is to live in it for one year, and then sell it at
a price of 15 the next year, giving him marginal utility of 16, less than the price of
18 (expressed in terms of good F ).
The most interesting aspect of the collateral equilibrium is the …rst order condition
for the buyer of collateral. The purpose of collateral is to enable people like B, who
desperately want housing but cannot a¤ord much (for example in the contract less
economy), to buy the housing and live in it by borrowing against the future, using the
house as collateral. To the extent that collateral is not a perfect device for borrowing,
one might expect that B does not quite get all the housing he needs, and that the
marginal utility of housing might end up greater to B than the marginal utility of
food. In fact, the opposite is true.
In collateral equilibrium, the marginal utility of a dollar of housing is substantially
less than the marginal utility of a dollar of food
M UxB0F
M UxB0H
30
5
=
< =
p0H
18
1
p0F
So why does B buy housing at all? Because he can buy on margin, i.e. with leverage.
He needs to pay only 3 = 18 15 of cash down for the house, getting 15 utiles in
period 0, and then he can give the house up in period 1 to repay his loan. This
leveraged purchase brings 5 utiles per dollar. This is exactly equal to the marginal
utility of food per dollar.
This is a completely general phenomenon. The leveraged purchase brings more
marginal utility than the straight cash purchase to any buyer who consumes a positive
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amount at time 0 and is constrained from borrowing as much as he would like by the
collateral requirment.6
4.1.4

Liquidity Wedge and Collateral Value

To the extent that collateral is not perfect in solving the borrowing problem, borrowers
will be constrained from borrowing as much as they would like. The upshot is that
the marginal utility today of the price of the contracts the borrowers can get by
selling is much higher than the marginal utility to them of the deliveries they have
to make: that is what it means for them to be constrained in their selling of loans,
i.e., constrained in their borrowing. In Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008b) we called this the
liquidity wedge.
In the above example, contract j = 15 sells for a price of 15, which gives B
marginal utility at time 0 of (9 4x0F )15 = 5(15) = 75: The marginal utility of the
deliveries of 15 that B must make at time 1 is (1)(15) = 15: This surplus B gains by
borrowing explains why he will choose to sell only the contract j = 15 that maximizes
the amount of money he raises. Selling a contract with j<15 is silly. It deprives B of
the opportunity to earn more liquidity surplus. Selling contract 16 would not bring
any more cash, because contract 16 sells for the same price as contract 15 even though
it promises more.
The collateral has a price of 18 relative to food, which is much too high to be
explained by its utility relative to food. But as explained in Fostel-Geanakoplos
(2008b), the price is equal to the payo¤ value plus the collateral value. Housing does
double duty. It enables B agents to get utility by living there, but it also enables B
agents to borrow more and to gain more liquidity surplus.
p0H = payo¤ value + collateral value
payo¤ value =

(M UxB0H

collateral value = (M UxB0F

+

M UxB0F
= (15 + 15)=5 = 6
p0F
M UxB0F
M UxB1F D15 )=
= (5 15 1 15)=5 = 12
p0F

M UxB1H )=

15

p0H = 6 + 12 = 18
4.1.5

The Failure of "E¢ cient Markets"

The e¢ cient markets hypothesis essentially says that prices are priced fairly by the
market, and that even an uninformed agent should not be afraid to trade, because
the prices already incorporate the information acquired by more sophisticated agents.
6

This point is made in Geanakoplos (1997), from where this example is taken. By contrast, in
Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) the marginal utility of collateral per dollar of its price is higher for its owner
than the marginal utility per dollar of consumption. But that is only because the collateral owner
cannot spend any of his consumption money on the asset.

43

That is true in collateral equilibrium for the contracts, but it is not true of the assets
that can be used as collateral. An unsophisticated buyer who did not know how to
use leverage would …nd that he grossly overpaid for housing.
4.1.6

Optimal Collateral Levels?

What would happen if the government simply refused to let borrowers leverage so
much, say by prohibiting the trade in contracts for j > 14? Although every type
B agent wants to leverage up, using j = 15, when all the other type B agents are
doing the same, he is actually much better o¤ if leverage is limited by government
…at. Then everybody will borrow using asset j = 14, and with less buying power, the
price of housing will fall. In fact p0H will fall to 17:05; and the downpayment of 3:05
needed to buy the house is therefore barely more than before. (The consumption of
the B types in period 0 is then a bit smaller than it was, raising the marginal utility
of consumption in period 0. The net utility of buying the house after repaying the
loan is now increased from 15 to 15+1=16, so the marginal utility condition continues
to hold.) The big di¤erence is that agent B will only have to deliver 14 in period 1
instead of 15. B gains about .7 utiles and A loses about .94 utiles. In short the limit
on leverage works out as a transfer from A to B.
4.1.7

Why did Housing Prices Rise so much from 1996-2006?

We can put our last observation more directly. Limits on leverage will reduce collateral
goods prices, and an expansion of leverage will increase their prices. The remarkable
run-up in housing prices in the middle 1990s to the middle 2000s is in my mind less
a matter of irrational exuberance than of leverage.
We now consider a more complicated variation of our basic example in which there
is uncertainty and default. Now a higher collateral requirement would mean strictly
less default, but also lower housing prices. So it is interesting to see which collateral
requirement best suits the sellers/lenders.

4.2

Example: Borrowing Across States of Nature, with Default

We consider almost the same economy as before, with two agents A and B, and two
goods F (food) and H (housing) in each period. But now we suppose that there are
two states of nature s = 1 and 2 in period 1, occurring with objective probabilities
(1 ") and "; respectively. This example is also taken from Geanakoplos (1997).
As before, we suppose that food is completely perishable and housing is perfectly
durable.
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We assume
uA (x0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ; x2F ; x2H ) = x0F + x0H + (1 ")(x1F + x1H ) + "(x2F + x2H ) ;
uB (x0F ; x0H ; x1F ; x1H ; x2F ; x2H ) = 9x0F

2x20F + 15x0H + (1 ")(x1F + 15x1H ) + "(x2F + 15x2H ) :

Furthermore, we suppose that
A
A
A
A
A
eA = (eA
0F ; e0H ; (e1F ; e1H ); (e2F ; e2H )) = (20; 1; (20; 0); (20; 0)) ;
B
B
B
B
B
eB = (eB
0F ; e0H ; (e1F ; e1H ); (e2F ; e2H )) = (4; 0; (50; 0); (9; 0)) :

To complete the model, we suppose as before that there are contract promises Aj
with Asj = (j; 0), 8s 2 S promising j units of good F in every state s = 1 and 2,
and no housing. We suppose that the collateral requirement for each contract is one
house Cj = (0; 1), as before.
The only di¤erence between this model and the certainty case we had before is
that B is poorer in state 2, and so the housing price must drop in state 2. The …rst
question is how leveraged will the market allow B to become? Will it allow B to
default?
It turns out that it is very easy to calculate the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium and
the collateral equilibrium for arbitrary "; such as " = 1=4. But the no collateral
equilibrium is given by a very messy formula, so we content ourselves for that case
with an approximation when " 0.
4.2.1

Arrow–Debreu Equilibrium

The unique (in utility payo¤s) Arrow–Debreu equilibrium is:
p = ((p0F ; p0H ); (p1F ; p1H ); (p2F ; p2H )) = ((1; 30); (1 ")(1; 15); "(1; 15)) ;
A
A
A
A
A
xA = ((xA
0F ; x0H ); (x1F ; x1H ); (x2F ; x2H )) = (22; 0); 20 +
B
B
B
B
B
xB = ((xB
0F ; x0H ); (x1F ; x1H ); (x2F ; x2H )) = (2; 1); 50

uA = 70; uB = 62

28
;
(1 ")

28
;
1 "

0 ; (20; 0)

;

1 ; (9; 1) ;

41" :

Since agent B is so rich in state 1, he sells o¤ enough wealth from there in exchange
for period 0 wealth to bid the price up to his marginal utility of 30. Notice that agent
B transfers wealth from state 1 back to period 0, and by holding the house he also
transfers wealth from state 0 to state 2. With complete markets there is no collapse in
housing prices in state 2, despite the hit the demanders take to their income, because
those B agents e¤ectively buy insurance against that state.
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4.2.2

No-Collateral Equilibrium

When " > 0 is very small, we can easily give an approximation to the unique equilibrium with no collateral by starting from the equilibrium in which " = 0.
j

=0;

p = ((p0F ; p0H ); (p1F ; p1H ); (p2F ; p2H )) =

(1; 16); (1; 15);

1;

9
1

71
32 16

((1; 16); (1; 15); (1; 10:4)) ;
A
A
A
A
A
xA = ((xA
0F ; x0H ); (x1F ; x1H ); (x2F ; x2H ))

xB
0H );
B

B

((xB
0F ;

A

56 ; u

x =
u

4.2.3

(xB
1F ;

xB
1H );

(xB
2F ;

xB
2H ))

71
;
32
71
32 16

20 +
57
;
32

1

71
32 16

; 35 +

; 35
15 71
;
32 16

15 71
;
32 16

0 ; (29; 0) ;

1 ; (0; 1) ;

64 :

Collateral Equilibrium

We can exactly calculate the unique collateral equilibrium by noting that if B promises
more in state 2 than the house is worth, then he will default and the house will be
con…scated. But after all the agents of type B default in state 2, they will spend all
of their endowment eB
2F on good 2H, giving a price p2H = 9. Perhaps surprisingly the
equilibrium described below con…rms that the B agents do choose to promise more
than they can pay in state 2, and the A agents knowingly buy those promises. Indeed
the same contract j = 15 is traded as when there was certainty and no default. Its
price is 15 = (1 ")15 + "9 because the rational A agents pay less, anticipating the
default in state 2.
D1j = min(j; 15); D2j = min(j; 9); j = (1 ")D1j + "D2j ;
((p0F ; p0H ); (p1F ; p1H ); (p2F ; p2H )) = ((1; 3 + 15 ); (1; 15); (1; 9)) ;
A
A
A
A
A
xA = ((xA
0F ; x0H ); (x1F ; x1H ); (x2F ; x2H )) = ((23; 0); (35; 0); (29; 0)) ;

'A
15 =

15 ; 'A
j = 0 for j 6= 15 ;

B
'B
15 = 15 ; 'j = 0 for j 6= 15 ;

B
B
B
B
B
xB = ((xB
0F ; x0H ); (x1F ; x1H ); (x2F ; x2H )) = ((1; 1); (35; 1); (0; 1))

At the equilibrium prices, each agent of type A is just indi¤erent to buying or not
buying any contract. At these prices any agent of type B reasons exactly as before.
Since money is so much more valuable to him at time 0 than it is in the future, he
will borrow as much as he can, even if it leads to default in state 2. He will only
trade contract j = 15. Notice that the amount of default in the bad state, and the
equilibrium downpayment of 3 on the house, do not depend on the probability 1 "
of the good state.
Thus we see that the free market will not choose levels of collateral which eliminate
default. We are left to wonder whether the collateral levels are in any sense optimal
for the economy: does the free market arrange for the optimal amount of default?
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4.2.4

Excess Volatility

Since the 1929 stock market crash it has been widely argued that low margin requirements can increase the volatility of stock prices. The argument is usually of the
following kind: when there is bad news about the stocks, margins are called and the
agents who borrowed against the stocks are forced to put them on the market, which
lowers their prices still further.
The trouble with this argument is that it does not quite go far enough. In general
equilibrium theory, every asset and commodity is for sale at every moment. Hence
the crucial step in which the borrowers are forced to put the collateral up for sale has
by itself no bite. On the other hand the argument is exactly on the right track.
We argued that using houses or stocks, or mortgage derivatives as collateral for
loans (i.e., allowing them to be bought on margin) makes their prices more volatile.
The reason is that those agents with the most optimistic view of the assets’future
values, or simply the highest marginal utility for their services, will be enabled by
buying on margin to hold a larger fraction of them than they could have a¤orded
otherwise. But with bad news for the asset, there is a redistribution of wealth away
from the optimists and toward the pessimists who did not buy on margin. The
marginal buyer of the stock is therefore likely to be someone less optimistic or less
rich than would have been the case had the stock not been purchased on margin, and
the income redistribution not been so severe. Thus the fall in price is likely to be
more severe than if the stock could not have been purchased on margin.
Our story is borne out vividly in the example when di¤erences stem not from
optimism but from heterogeneous tastes for housing. When the housing stock can
be purchased on margin (i.e., used as collateral), agents of type B are enabled to
purchase the entire housing stock, raising its price from 16 (where it would have been
without collateral) to 18. In the bad state these agents default and all their holdings
of the housing stock are seized. Although they end up buying back the entire housing
stock, their wealth is so depleted that they can only bid up the housing prices to 9.
When there is no collateral the agents of type B can a¤ord to purchase only a
fraction = 71=(32)(16) of the housing stock at time 0 (if " is very small). But they
own that share free and clear of any debts. Thus when bad news comes, they do not
lose anything. They can apply their wealth to purchasing the remaining 1
of the
housing stock, which forces the price up to approximately 10.4. Thus when there is
no leverage, the housing prices are never as high nor never as low as when the housing
stock can be used as collateral. When markets are complete, the housing price is 15
at both states, una¤ected by the shock to the wealth of B agents.
4.2.5

Endogenous Incomplete Markets

Until now we have assumed that markets were incomplete, restricting contracts to
promises that were non-contingent, and then …nding the endogenous leverage. Suppose a contingent contract were o¤ered that paid only in the down state, using the
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house as collateral. (Or paid only in the up state). It is evident that if such a contract
could be traded, and if delivery were enforced by harsh penalties, then there would
be Pareto gains to be made. Either contingent contract, together with the riskless
promise, would create full spanning. But if contracts could only be enforced with
collateral, would either contingent contract be traded? The answer is no! Such a
contract wastes collateral, which is in very short supply, because it does not use the
collateral value of the house in the other state. A moment’s re‡ection should convince
the reader that no matter what contract is o¤ered, the only ones that will be traded
would be those that promised more than the full value of the house in every state.
This stands in contrast to the example in Section II where the collateral would be
plentiful enough to support trade in Arrow securities if they were introduced.
Of course the situation would be quite di¤erent if the same house could back
multiple promises, one paying o¤ exclusively in the …rst state and the other paying
o¤ exclusively in the second state. That kind of tranching would lead to spanning.
(But not necessarily to the complete markets solution, since the amount of promises
would still be limited by the collateral.) In practice one piece of collateral rarely
has several anti-correlated loans written on it; tranching like that occurs only on big
pools of assets. One house might have two mortgages written on it, but in the good
states they both deliver in full, and in the bad states they are both compromised.
What is interesting here is that the scarcity of collateral does not ration trade
equally in all contracts, say reducing trade in each Arrow security by 40%. Instead
it shuts down trade altogether in many contracts (here in both Arrow securities)
and concentrates it all in a di¤erent, less felicitous, but more collateral economizing,
contract.
4.2.6

Ine¢ ciency and Government Intervention

Ine¢ ciency arises in these models from sources apart from over-leveraging. First,
promises only come in limited forms (like the non-contingent promises we have mostly
assumed), preventing some kinds of insurance from being traded. In our example (or
in a slight modi…cation of it such as we shall shortly consider), agents of type B
might want to buy insurance that pays o¤ in state 2 from agents of type A. But if
all contracts are non-contingent, that insurance is not available. Second, even if the
promises could come in any form, their quantity and form are limited by the scarcity
of collateral, as we saw in the last section. The scarcity of collateral will often shut
down many …nancial markets altogether, including the insurance market for state
2. This gives a compelling reason for the government to provide that insurance,
e¤ectively bailing people out in the down state.
The government can always …nd some intervention to compensate for the missing
markets or the collateral constraints to make everybody better o¤. For example, a
transfer to every agent at time 0 who begins the period without a house, coupled
with a transfer to every agent who begins a state in period 1 without a house, would
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make everyone better o¤. These transfers together simply amount to a loan from A to
B: the private sector cannot manage to reproduce these additional transfers because
there is not enough collateral.
But in keeping with the subject of this paper, I shall ignore these interventions
and con…ne my attention to the e¢ cacy of regulating leverage. In the section on
heterogeneous priors we found …ve reasons why there might be excessive leverage.
But in that model there was no default. When there is heterogeneous utility for
holding collateral, we found that default naturally arises in equilibrium, if markets
are incomplete. This gives rise to another three dangers from excessive leverage, in
addition to the …ve discussed earlier.
A sixth source is debt overhang (see Myers 1977). In our example, agents of type
B and A will agree to trade loans that promise 15 in both states in period 1, as we
saw. Imagine now that B had an opportunity to invest units of food-equivalent at
time 0 to increase the size of his house by % at time 1. The expected revenue this
brings is (1 ")15 % + "9 %: However, if B tries to raise this money by issuing
new debt that is junior to the debt already issued, he can only deliver (1 ")15 %
because the revenue in the second state will go to the old bondholders. Even if the
new debt is of equal seniority to the old debt, it will be heavily diluted in the second
state. So if (1 ")15 % + "9 % > > (1 ")15 %; an e¢ cient investment will not
be made. There is no investment in the current model, but we return to this problem
in two sections.
A seventh source of ine¢ ciency is the cost of seizing collateral, which until now
we have taken to be zero. We discuss this in detail in the next section.
I conclude with an eighth problem that that also could sometimes be helped
by limiting leverage, whether or not there is default. When markets are incomplete,
Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis (1986) showed that generically there is an intervention at
time 0 alone that can lead to a Pareto improvement by changing the asset ownership
structure. When markets reclear in period 1 the new distribution of assets leads to
a change in prices which itself redistributes wealth across states in a way that was
not spanned by the asset payo¤s. In the example of this Section, the type B agents
would like to buy insurance for state 2, but cannot.
In the example as it stands, curtailing leverage does not help, because it does not
change prices in period 1. In particular, prohibiting contracts j > 14 would not be
Pareto improving. In the new equilibrium only contract j = 14 would be traded, but
the price of housing in states 1 and 2 would remain at 15 and 9, respectively.
But one could imagine a variant of the example, obtained partly by making the
utilities strictly concave, such that a limit on leverage would change prices in a helpful
direction. With less borrowing, B would be richer in period 1. This would turn prices
against B in state 1 where B was already rich and buying. But it would turn prices
in B’s favor in state 2 where he had been a forced seller that now can sell less. These
price changes have the same e¤ect as the missing insurance contract, which transfers
wealth from B to A in state 1, and from A to B in state 2. That is the key idea to
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the Geanakoplos-Kubler (2005) model.
Typically the intervention will need to be on several policy dimensions, especially
if there are many types of agents; curtailing leverage alone is very unlikely to lead to
Pareto improvements, unless some of the previous seven elements are present.
4.2.7

Under Water Collateral and Foreclosure Costs

Let us change our model in a simple way to account for the fact that foreclosure is
a very expensive operation. (This is a non-pecuniary externality). Suppose that for
each dollar the loan exceeds the market price of the collateral, the con…scator of the
property must pay a dollar to repair the house and restore it to a condition at which
it can be sold at the market price. This means that a house for which the LTV is
160% (the loan is 60% above the market value of the house) would require 60% of its
market value be squandererd in repairs from the damages caused by foreclosure. The
lender would thus recoup only 40%=160% = 25% of his loan when seizing the house.
These numbers are completely consistent with recovery rates on foreclosures today in
the subprime housing market.7
The question is: if borrowers and lenders are aware of these terrible foreclosure
losses, will they nevertheless trade loans which they foresee will create substantial
deadweight losses?
In the economy with foreclosure costs, we can compute that indeed the equilibrium
leverage will be just as big! No matter what the value of " < 1; the only traded
contract will be j = 15: In equilibrium we …nd that
15

p0H

= (1 ")15 + "(9
= 3 + 15

(15

9))

The rest of the equilibrium can be guessed as before.
Now we can ask our question again: what would happen if the government regulated leverage in period 0 by prohibiting any contracts with j > 15
?
It is easy to check that only the contract j = 15
would be traded, and that
we would have
15

p0H

= (1 ")(15
3 + 15

) + "(9

(15

9))

The regulated curtailment of leverage would have the e¤ect of reducing housing prices
by a little less than (1 ")
" = (1 2") ; lowering the utility of A by the same
7

Another way to explain the increasing loss with greater loans is to suppose that the values of
the houses in the second state are actually not certain, but are distributed over some interval. The
greater the debt, the higher the fraction of houses that must be con…scated, so with a constant
foreclosure cost (or cost proportional to the sales price), the higher the debt, the greater will be the
foreclosure losses.
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amount. The utility of B would rise by (1 ") , this time giving an increase in the
sum of utilities. Curtailing leverage is now bene…cial, provided the probability of
down is not too low, because this lowers the deadweight loss in the down state. The
individual agents will not curtail leverage themselves, even though they internalize
the externality, because the borrowers are so desperate to borrow money. What they
don’t realize is that if all of them borrowed less, the price of housing at time 0 would
fall and so they would not lose much by borrowing less, yet would still avoid the
deadweight loss in the bad state.
There is a limit on how big can be, however, because if 3 + 15 falls below
1 + (1 ")15 + "9; then the type A agents will buy the house at time 0.
In the next section, however, we see that there is lots of room to curtail leverage.
When there are foreclosure costs, the equilibrium contract described in Section
V.B.6, where agents had the freedom to design contracts with any promises they
liked, would change. Now the mortgage payment due would be indexed to the price
of housing. That way the lender could avoid the foreclosure costs, which are based on
the how far under water the house becomes. In the real world we do not yet see such
contracts. The real world seems closer to the situation we described in all the other
sections, outside of V.B.6, in which promises are non-contingent by assumption.

5
5.1

The Double Leverage Cycle
Mortgages and Repos

By combining the two main models from the last sections, I build a model of the
double leverage cycle that allows us to see all eight of the potential pitfalls of leverage.
One of the main causes of the severity of the current leverage cycle is that there are two
of them, in the housing market via mortgages and in the mortgage securities market
via the repo market, and the two reinforce each other in a destructive feedback.
Houses back mortgage securities, hence a crash in housing prices has rami…cations
for the securities market. But a crash in the price of mortgage securities a¤ects the
loans homeowners can get, which in turn a¤ects the housing market. One minor twist
to the models is that I assume houses must be constructed.
So consider now a population made up of the type B homeowners from the model
of Section IV, who get utility from living in houses as well as from consumption,
and the investors h 2 [0; 1] from the model of Section III, who only get utility from
consumption. The homeowners will issue long maturity mortgages in order to borrow
the money to build their houses, using the houses as collateral. As in the model of
Section IV, these mortgages will be endogenously chosen in equilibrium at levels that
lead to default when the houses lose too much value. We suppose as in Section IV that
there is a substantial foreclosure loss. It will turn out that the mortgage has payo¤s
exactly like the payo¤s from the Y security in our …rst model. These mortgages will
be packaged and sold to the optimists h 2 [:87; 1] who …gure the state is very likely
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to be a good state in which the houses are valuable and the mortgages pay o¤ in
full. The optimists will borrow the money to buy the mortgages from the pessimists
h 2 [0; :87) in the short maturity repo market, using the mortgages as collateral for
their loans. The houses thus serve twice as collateral, …rst backing the homeowner
mortgage loans, and then backing the mortgage securities which back the optimists’
repo borrowing.
More concretely, let us consider an economy with 3 time periods 0,1,2, and states
of the world 0,U,D,UU,UD,DU,DD, as in Section III. In addition to the durable
consumption good, which we now call canned food, and housing, there is also a labor
good to enable the building of the houses. We use the letter F to describe the canned
food, H for housing, and L to denote leisure. Suppose there is a constant-returns-toscale production technology that is owned by a pro…t maximizing entrepreneur and
that can take 18.5 units of labor at time 0 and transform them into a house at time
0 (that will then be perfectly durable). Canned food can be eaten at any time, but
is durable. Housing can be enjoyed with no diminution to its quantity.
Let there be a continuum of type B agents who each begin with 1 unit of canned
food and 3.15 units of labor, and no houses at time 0, and 50 units of canned food
in UU,UD,DU, and 9 units of canned food in DD, and no other endowments. This
is exactly like the model of Section IV, except that we stretch out the model to
three periods by inserting another period in the middle. Let type B agents assign
probability (1 ") to nature moving up at any state, and suppose the marginal utility
of leisure (that is, the marginal disutility of labor) is denoted by c. Let their utility
be
uB (x0F ; x0H ; x0L ; xU U F ; xU U H ; xU DF ; xU DH ; xDU F ; xDU H ; xDDF ; xDDH ; )
= 9x20F 2x20F + 15x0H + cx0L + (1 ")2 (xU U F + 15xU U H )+
(1 ")"(xU DF + 15xU DH ) + "(1 ")(xDU F + 15xDU H ) + "2 (xDDF + 15xDDH )
B
B
B
B
B
B
((eB
0F ; e0H ; e0L ); (eU U F ; eU DF ; eDU F ; eDDF ))
= ((1; 0; 3:15); (50; 50; 50; 9))

Suppose also there is a continuum of agents h 2 [0; 1] who are exactly like the
agents in our …rst model, except that instead of owning one unit of X and Y at time
0, they each own 15 units of food and 15 hours of labor at time 0. Agent h 2 [0; 1]
has utility and endowments
uh (x0F ; x0L ; x0L ; xU F ; xDF ; xU U F ; xU DF ; xDU F ; xDDF )
= x0F + cx0L + hxU F + (1 h)xDF
+ h2 xU U F + h(1 h)xU DF + (1 h)hxDU F + (1 h)2 xDDF
(eh0F ; eh0H ; eh0L ) = (15; 0; 15)
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These agents also have a disutility of work c: If c or c falls below the ratio of wages to
the price of food, then the type B agents or the heterogeneous agents h 2 [0; 1] will
stop working.
The contracts in the economy are of two types, depending on the collateral. In
one kind of contract j, called a mortgage loan of type j, agents at time 0 can make
a long term promise of the …xed amount j of good F in every one of the last states
UU,UD,DU,DD, using one house as collateral. In the other type of contract (s; k; j)
called a Repo, agents at node s can make a short term promise of k units of good F
in every immediate successor state of node s, using mortgage contract j as collateral.
In our economy, the type B agents will borrow money at time 0 by issuing the
mortgage j=15, using the house they will be constructing at the same time as collateral. The most optimistic agents in [0,1] will buy those mortgages, thereby lending
the B agents the money. Since the mortgages will default in state DD (but not until
then), they will be risky. Hence the pessimists will not want to buy those mortgages,
and the optimists don’t have enough money to buy them all. So they will borrow
money from the pessimists by selling repo loans against the mortgages they hold.
These safer repo loans will be held by the pessimists. The Repos are one-period
loans, unlike the mortgage, which is a two-period loan.8
Let us make the hypothesis that if the house is underwater by y dollars when the
loan comes due, then y dollars must be wasted in order to restore the house to mint
condition to sell on a par with the other houses on the market. In all the terminal
states except DD, the houses will not be underwater, and the house will sell for 15.
But in DD the house will only sell for 9, which means it will be underwater with a
mortgage promise of 15, so the mortgage will only deliver 9-(15-9)=3 to the mortgage
holder after he con…scates the house and sells it, net of the restoration costs.
We see that the terminal payo¤s of the mortgage security are (15,15,15,3), which
is tantamount to 15 units of the security Y from our …rst example. The agents of
type h each own 15 units of the canned food, exactly 15 times what they owned of the
durable consumption good before, and their labor income is exactly enough to buy
one mortgage security, again 15 times as valuable as the security in our …rst example.
Hence this equilibrium we are computing is just the one in our …rst example scaled
up by a factor of 15.
In view of our earlier analysis, equilibrium is easy to describe. We normalize
by taking the price of canned food to be 1 in every state. In equilibrium the price
of labor in period 0 will be :95. The income of the B agents at time 0 is then
1 + (3:15)(:95) = 4. By constant returns to scale, the price of the house will then
be (18:15)(:95) = (3:15 + 15)(:95) = 3 + 14:25 = 17:25. The B agents will each buy
a house by putting 3 dollars down and borrowing the remaining 14.25 by issuing a
8

It can be shown that if short term mortgages were o¤ered, they would not be traded. Since
there is a large foreclosure loss from default, and since the equilibrium mortgage involves default, it
is not in the interest of borrower and lender to have short term mortgages. Thus the mortgages are
endogenously long term loans, and the repos are endogenously short term loans
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mortgage j=15 promising 15 in every state in the last period.
In state D the mortgage will be worth 15(.69)=10.4 dollars. In state 0, the top
13% of agents h will buy the mortgages by issuing repos promising k=15(.69). In
state D these optimists will be wiped out, and the mortgages will fall into the hands
of more pessimistic investors. Agents h 2 [:61; :87) will buy the mortgage securities
at D, issuing contract (D,k,15), where k=3, in the repo market to borrow money to
help them buy the mortgages. It is easy to check that every agent is optimizing, and
working full time, provided c < :95.
Part of the reason the price of mortgages is so low at D is that the payo¤s are so
bad at DD, which reduces not just the value of the mortgages at D but the leverage
that can be obtained in the repo market on that reduced value.

5.2

What’s so bad about the leverage cycle?

In the leverage cycle asset prices shoot up and shoot down as leverage changes. This
drastic change is unsettling in any real economy, and I would argue is a danger in
and of itself. But why is this so bad in welfare terms? In our double leverage model
we can see how all eight problems with excessive leverage could arise at once, as they
have in reality.
First, note that the equilibrium mortgage prices, and therefore the equilibrium
housing prices, depends on the probability beliefs of just 13% of one class of investors
at 0, and 39% 13% = 26% at D. The beliefs of the continuum of B buyers is
irrelevant, as are the beliefs of the bottom 61% of the heterogeneous class.
Second, the wages of housing labor at 0 of .95 is determined by the housing prices.
If the marginal disutility of labor for the heterogeneous class were say c = :9, then
we can see how the great housing boom at time 0 is fueled by the optimistic beliefs
of the top 13%. Lower their beliefs a bit and mortgage prices and thus housing prices
will fall, and then wages might fall below .9, which would shrink the building boom
at 0.
Third, with the optimists fueling the leverage cycle, asset prices collapse at D, and
new activity plunges as well. Had we allowed for new construction at D, we would
…nd lower wages and very little construction.
Fourth, at U the top 13% of the heterogeneous agents get rich; at D they go
bankrupt. Inequality rises. Fifth, their absence is one reason so little new construction
would take place at D.
Sixth, not only would new homes be less likely to be built at D because of lower
mortgage prices (higher mortgage rates), but existing homeowners would be less likely
to spend money on repairing their houses. The homeowners are all underwater there,
with a nominal debt of 15 but the price of housing only 15(.69). The debt overhang
eliminates much of the incentive to repair, since increases in the value of the house
at DD will not help the homeowner since the house will be foreclosed anyway.
Seventh, the large mortgages homeowners and lenders agreed upon at 0 lead to
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huge foreclosure losses at DD. These losses are foreseen and taken into account in the
terms of the contracts at date 0, yet they still arise.
Eighth, a key externality that borrowers and lenders on both the mortgage and
repo markets at time 0 do not recognize is that if leverage were curtailed, prices
would be much higher at D. For example, foreclosure costs at DD would be less,
which, besides raising the expected payo¤ of the mortgage, would also make it easier
to leverage at D. Higher leverage means a higher marginal buyer, which would raise
the price at D. This in e¤ect would provide insurance for investors at D who we could
imagine need to sell promises in order to start new building, but who are unable to
buy the insurance directly because of the missing markets.

6

Contagion

The crisis of 2007-9 spread from the subprime mortgage market across the global
economy. This shocked most analysts, who did not see how the losses of $400 billion
or so in one market could set o¤ losses of $50 trillion or more in other global markets.
Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008b) gave one possible explanation for contagion. We argued that if the same investors were the leveraged optimists in many markets (called
crossover investors), then bad news in just one sector could cause price drops in other
markets with totally independent payo¤s. Once the scale of leverage is recognized, it
becomes apparent that the pool of risk taking capital is small compared to the size
of global asset markets; once it shrinks, and once de-leveraging starts, prices fall in
unrelated sectors.
In the …rst model of this paper, the price of Y falls at D because there is bad
news about Y, because leverage on Y falls, and because the most optimistic buyers
are wiped out. Suppose we added another asset Z for which the move to D provided
no information: for instance, suppose the payo¤s of Z were 1 at UU and .3 at UD,
but also 1 at DU and .3 at DD. Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008b) argues that the price of Z
would fall as well at D, provided that the optimists about Y were also relatively more
optimistic about Z. The reason is that they would be poorer at D and so less able to
hold assets in general, and also more risk averse; they would be able to borrow less
at D in total (because leverage of Y falls); and they would see a greater opportunity
in the Y market as a result of the price decline and so withdraw money from other
markets like Z to invest in Y.
Fostel-Geanakoplos (2008b) also argued that the assets which could serve as good
collateral would fall least in value –we called this phenomenon ‡ight to collateral, as
opposed to the standard ‡ight to quality. Finally, we also argued that if there were
asymmetric information about the quality of the collateral, then agents who knew
they had good collateral would reduce their borrowing by more than agents with bad
collateral. We would expect debt market closures in less bad economies before we
saw it in the worst economies.
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